Will and Memory

As previously discussed, according to the model of Experience being presented here, the immediate object of Consciousness is always Will, i. e. one's Motility, and perceptual activity is a species of Motility. Hence, for example, the 'consciousness of visual image X' is, more properly, 'the consciousness of looking at X'. Similarly, the immediate object of Memory is always Motility, e. g. what one remembers is not the visual image X, but one's looking at X. Furthermore, according to this model, Experience is cumulative, so that one's remembering of one's looking at X is also one's remembering of oneself at previous stage of one's current self, a stage which itself similarly incorporates its antecedents. On this basis, Bergson's theory of pure Memory is erroneous in two respects--that different memory images are independent of one another, and that even when not being applied to current activity, a memory image is detached from one's current Self.