Sense Experience

The thesis, previously presented, that the functioning of the sense organs is primarily motile, effects a sharp distinction between Consciousness and Sense Experience. Instead of the traditional interpretations of Sensation either as an immediate object of Consciousness or as itself a mode of Consciousness, on this thesis, Sensation is primarily implicated in the causal interaction between a subject and its environment, an interaction that can subsequently become an immediate object of Consciousness. Thus, 'I sense red' is, more precisely, 'I am aware of my having been looking at a red object', just as 'I feel the ground' is, more precisely, 'I am aware of my having been walking'. So, on this thesis, the immediate object of representation is an immediately prior activity of the subject. But, any such activity is not contextless--it constitutes a variation in the ongoing course of a subject's life. Likewise, any sense datum that is implicated in an immediate object of activity is not opaque, but expresses a variance with respect to a prior sensory condition.