Appearance and Space

Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' recasts things into appearances, i. e. into objects qua being perceived, regardless of what they might be in themselves, or even of that they might be in themselves. Concomitantly, the spatiality of those objects is recast as a structure of the process of intuiting them, and nothing besides. But, by defining Appearance in terms of cognitive processes, Kant suppresses another dimension of it, and, thereby, another notion of Space. He gives no consideration to the active process of Appearing, which transpires not merely e. g. when an actor emerges from the wings onto the stage, but, in general, in any kind of putting forth, e. g. the execution of an intention. Appearing, in this sense, thus, as has been previously discussed, Spatializes itself, producing a Spatiality that inheres it, and precedes any cognition of it. Accordingly, as a function of activity, the division of the Kantian architectonic that this notion of Space properly belongs to is not that devoted to Cognition, but to that concerned with action, i. e. the Critique of Practical Reason.