Schopenhauer, Kant, and Pessimism

Schopenhauer mis-reads Kant in three crucial respects. First, he misses Kant's Constructionism, i. e. he misses that the thesis of the unknowability of noumena is not Kant's definitive Epistemological position, but a phase of his Constructionism, i. e. that Knowledge is a constructive process, and that what we construct is knowable. Hence, because he misses this latter phase, Schopenhauer interprets Kant's delimitation of Knowledge as an assertion of the vanity of presumed Knowledge, and, hence, as grounds of Pessimism. Second, he attributes to Kant a concept of Reason that is actually Hume's, namely that Reason is merely instrumental, and merely at the service of selfishness. But Kant's concept of Reason is Leibnizian, i. e. a concept of a Totality that transcends any selfishness, e. g. his 'kingdom Ends'. Hence, Schopenhauer's accusation that Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason promotes selfishness, is based on a mis-attribution to it of the Humean concept of Reason. Finally, these two mis-readings set the stage for a third, an interpretation of a betrayal of Reason as one by Reason. Already convinced that Kant's presumed selfish Principle of Pure Practical Reason is a betrayal of the presumed Pessimism of the 1st Critique, Schopenhauer sees as proof of that betrayal Kant's later 2nd Critique introduction of the thesis that Rational Virtue deserves Happiness. Indeed, on the Constructionist interpretation of Kant, the notion of Deserved Happiness does constitute a betrayal, but one of Reason, by Kant's theological commitments. So, if a Pessimist is seeking a target among Kant's three Critiques, it would instead be the 3rd, Kant's defense of Deserved Happiness, that he explicitly describes as his answer to the question, 'What can I hope for?'