Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Concept and Conception
'Concept' is a traditionally central Philosophical notion, usually meaning 'abstract general representation', occasionally with further specification, for more precise use in some theories. In many cases, 'conception' is casually interchangeable with 'concept'. Conversely, though, there is one use of 'conception' for which 'concept' is not substitutable--the biological one, meaning 'initiation of pregnancy'. However, that exclusive connotation of 'conception' does suggest its suitability for a specialized Philosophical use here. Previously introduced has been the process Preception, i. e. the process of acting on a precept. Now, the understanding of a precept differs from that of a merely descriptive proposition, because unlike the latter, it is incomplete without subsequent action. In other words, the difference between the two types of understanding is analogous to that between 'conception' and 'concept'. So, insofar as 'concept' usually refers to the kind of cognitive representation involved in the understanding of descriptive propositions, 'conception' can be defined as 'the understanding of a precept'.
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