Divine Omniscience and Income Inequality

Even if God does play dice with the universe, his presumed omniscience guarantees that he knows the outcome in advance.  Now, that divine characteristic contributes to doctrines of Predestination, since if God knows from the outset what will occur, and is omnipotent, all events must be expressions of divine will.  Thus, in particular, good fortune and ill fortune are expressions of divine Grace and Damnation, which as Weber shows, are the cornerstones of some varieties of Capitalism.  So, if Weber is correct, the political fight against income inequality is, according to some, blasphemous.  In any case, Einstein might be correct that God does not play dice with the universe, simply because, as omniscient, he would know the outcome anyhow, thereby eliminating the possible play factor from any motivation to do so.

Physics, Determinism, Divine Omnipotence

Whether or not it is true, "God does not play dice with the universe" is misformulated, perhaps as a reflection of ignorance. For, Einstein's referent is the object of the study initiated by Newton.  Now, according to the latter, that object, the physical world, is created ex nihilo by a deity, a creation that consists in setting it in motion, after which there is no further divine intervention.  In other words, implied in that Theological thesis is that the Determinism of the physical world reflects the omnipotence of its creator.  So, Einstein's refusal to accept the apparent indeterminacies of Quantum Physics is, first and foremost, a reaction to an implicit challenge to the omnipotence of the Newtonian deity.  Furthermore, since there is no post-creation involvement of the deity in the creation, if there is any moment when dice-playing would not occur, it is in the distant past.  Thus, a well-informed reaction to the apparent Quantum phenomena would be "God did not play dice with the universe".  This looseness of Einstein's formulation is perhaps an example of the general unawareness of the continuing influence of Medieval Theology, even on its presumed antithesis, Modern Science.

Determinism, Ends, Means

Many would agree that the behavior of a human organism is predetermined by some biological principle, e. g. to survive.  However, such a principle leaves indeterminate the means sought to achieve that end, thereby not precluding the possibility of Free Will as also a factor in the organism's behavior.  Accordingly, to fill the gap, Determinists often argue that if all the facts of its experience over the course were known, every new episode would be revealed as the effect of one or more prior influences.  Now, one straightforward response is that all the facts are not known, so that hypothesis does not prima facie suffice to rule out the possibility of either Free Will or Chance contributing to that experience.  Furthermore, the assertion begs the question--even granted the antecedent, there is no reason to deny that those facts are indeed sufficient to ground all that transpires thereafter. So, despite the dogmatic reductionism, there seems to be no good reason to reject the empirically sound thesis that human behavior combines determinacy and indeterminacy, perhaps distinguished as Ends and Means.

Free Will, Determinism, Deliberation

Because of the eschatological scale of the tradition debate, Free Will and Determinism are typically regarded as absolutely disjoint, though Kant shows that they might also be not incompatible.  Now, in ordinary contexts, behavior is easily interpreted as either self-motivated or the product of circumstances.  However, the absolute heterogeneity that even Kant accepts does not hinder the ordinary judgment that behavior can be the resultant of a combination of internal and external influences, calculated just like any combination of Forces.  On that basis, when called for, a judgment of a specific event in terms of Voluntary vs. Involuntary usually reflects a determination as to which of the influences is the stronger in the situation, e. g. a guilty verdict when a tough upbringing does not quite explain the violence of an assault.  That a procedure in those terms might be considered impossible at the eschatological level is perhaps a reflection of the irrelevance of the debate at that level, i. e. if either absolute Free Will or absolute Determinism is correct, there is nothing to deliberate in mundane judgments.

Voluntary, Intentional, Formal Causality

In typical contemporary jurisprudential contexts, the Voluntary vs. Involuntary distinction is based on that of Intentional vs. Unintentional.  Now, an Intention is usually conceived as a representation of a goal that precedes the actualization of the goal.  But, while that concept of the distinction might suffice in the context, Determinists argue that the representation that is classified as an 'intention' actually has, at most, as little causal efficacy as a wish, so, rigorously considered, the distinction from Involuntary collapses.  However, the persistent flaw with that analysis, one which even Spinoza repudiates, is that an Intention is present only at the outset of a course of action.  Rather, as that Determinist proposes, the concept of a Circle is not merely present at the outset of the drawing of a Circle, but guides the process to completion.  Likewise, recipes, instructions, etc. are all common examples of a representation functioning as more than the expression of a wish.  In other words, the Causality that Determinists deny to an Intention is either Efficient or Teleological, when, in fact, it is Formal.  So, if Intentional is defined as entailing Self-Control, i. e. an instance of Formal Causality, the concept of Voluntary resists the Determinist objection to it.

Nothingness, Freedom, Determinism

According to some, there is a constraint on an ex nihilo creator--Nothingness.  Accordingly,  this divine Nothingness is absolutely free.  Thus, too, is its secular version--Consciousness, in Sartre's system.  But, this absolute Freedom is not opposed to Determinism.  To the contrary, we are "condemned to be free", as Sartre famously formulates it.  On that basis, the standard concept of 'Determinism', e. g. Newtonian Physics, Behaviorism, etc., manifests a condition that he calls Bad Faith, which consists in the abdication of Freedom by fobbing it off on a purportedly impersonal power, e. g. a deity, an insuperable chain of events, etc.  Of course, Newtonian Physics presupposes the existence of an ex nihilo creator that does not intervene in the created once the act of creation is complete.  So, the Free Will vs. Determinism debate can be conceived as a surrogate for a Theological dispute, or, conversely, absent the Creationist premise, the scope of the debate becomes significantly deflated.

Swerve and Negation

While in British Phenomenalism, the nothingness that separates Sense Data is a passive feature, in Hegelian Phenomenology, Negation is an active, cardinal, principle.  Thus, influenced by Hegel, Marx is predisposed to interpreting Swerve as Negation.  But, doing so falsifies it in two significant ways.  First, Negation abstracts from the infinitude of possible new directions that can eventuate in a Swerve.  Second, even in its Determinate variety, Negation still effects a rupture in what is a continuous motion from the beginning of a Swerve to its completion.  In contrast, Darwinian Variation and Deleuzian Difference more accurately represent the structure of Swerve.