Will, Doubt, Habit

Descartes' exercise in Doubt is offered, and is usually interpreted, in Epistemological and Metaphysical terms, i. e. as a demonstration that 'I think' is the basis of Knowledge, and that Mind and Body are separate. However, with a different set of premises, the project takes on Psychological and Moral significance. For, given that sense-experience is belief about sensory input, that such belief is part of the formation of a plan of action, and that doubt is effected, as Descartes himself implies, by Agito, then such Doubting effects a disruption of behavior, i. e. it is nascent digression from a course of action that would begin with one's current circumstances. More precisely, insofar as Action combines Will and Comprehension, i. e. combines indeterminate Motility and some cognitive representation that imparts structure to it, Doubting disengages the former from the latter, thereby dismantling Action. Thus, insofar as Doubting can disrupt behavior, it can disrupt habitual behavior, which has Psychological significance, and insofar as habitual behavior is undesirable, Moral significance.

Will and Belief

James' notion 'Will to Believe' is often regarded as conflicting with his Pragmatism. For, while the notion entails a leap of faith, without evidence, to the affirmation of the proposition 'God exists', the Pragmatist concept of Truth requires the verifiability of an assertion, the possibility of which seems lacking in James' expression of religious belief. His main defense, that that proposition is a working hypothesis, still does not explain how it can be tested, but, furthermore, it reflects a deeper problem for him--that while he and his pioneering colleagues have formulated a distinctive Pragmatist criterion of Truth, they, nevertheless, continue to accept, from a tradition from which they otherwise divergence, the concept of 'belief' as fundamentally truth-aspirational. In contrast, here, a Belief functions primarily as structurer of Will, i. e. it provides indeterminate Motility with organization, thereby resulting in concrete action. Thus, on this model, to believe that 'God exists' is to adopt it as a plan of conduct, one that might, e. g. influence how one treats others. So, a Belief, in this sense, can be evaluated in terms of, for example, effectiveness, but whether or not it is 'true' has no meaning in the context. Hence, Belief, as a determinant of Will, is more authentically pragmatic than a psychological state that aspires to Truth.

Will and Non Sequitur

'Non sequitur' literally means 'does not follow', but in some contexts, e. g. in Logic, it means, more precisely, 'does not follow according to the rules'. By contrast, in other contexts, it is not necessarily a lapse, for a well-placed non sequitur can enhance an artistic or a comedic project. Furthermore, where it is taken intellectually seriously is as a Zen Koan, by which a teacher attempts to stimulate the wakefulness of a student. This provocative capacity of a non sequitur is not as extrinsic as it can seem. For, it is a pure expression of Will, the principle of Variation in Experience, and, hence, as such, it can occasion the disruption of automatic thinking patterns, and of mechanical behavior, in general. It is thus a virtue of a non sequitur that it eludes formularization.

Will and Negation

In systems of Dialectics, doubting is a species of Negation, which, in coordination with a synthesizing process, i. e. Sublation, produces Absolute Knowledge. For Dialectical Materialists, thinking is, essentially, negative--it negates existing 'material' conditions, i. e. it expresses a conflict with them. Implicit in this Materialist concept of Negation is the notion of obliteration. Now, while obliteration can be glossed as the absolute elimination of its object, in actuality, the destruction of something does not effect its complete disappearance, but consists in the transformation of it into another state, e. g. to ashes or to dust. In other words, obliteration in experience is never more than a variation of conditions, which requires Will, the principle of Diversification. Accordingly, Dialectical 'Negation' is a mode of volitional thinking, just as 'the negation of X' always means ' other than X'.

Will, Thinking, Counter-Example

While Descartes holds that volition and thought are distinct processes, for Spinoza, they are one and the same. Now, insofar as, Will is a principle of Diversification, as it is defined here, and 'thinking' is a process of synthesizing, volition and thought are not only distinct, but are inversely related. On the other hand, insofar as Exteriorization is, following Levinas, experiential Diversification, and Cartesian doubting is a departure from the given, 'thinking' qua 'Cartesian doubting' is volitional. Likewise for Spinozistic 'thought', insofar as it is conceived as deduction, emanation, or expressive, each of which entails the explication of what is implicit in God, i. e. explication is a type of exteriorization. However, both varieties of thinking remain circumscribed by the scope of the given that they modify. In contrast, a more decisive transgression of the given is effected by the thinking that generates counter-examples, a truly agitative process that not only introduces a rogue element, but often provokes a subsequent quest for a more comprehensive theory that can better accommodate the novelty. Such 'thinking' better exemplifies the concept of Will than does that of either Descartes or Spinoza.

Will, Doubt, Belief

While walking, one might pause because one suddenly suspects that the pavement directly ahead might be covered in black ice. Entailed in that hesitation is--an impulse to step, a belief that the pavement ahead is as stable as that behind has been, and a doubt that the pavement ahead is as stable as it appears to be. By comparison, Descartes' doubt that his situation is as it appears to be is exposed as abstracting not only from some ongoing Motility, but from the context of the appearance--that it is the content of a belief. In other words, the immediate object of Cartesian doubt is not some data, but some belief regarding that data, a belief that is in the service of Motility. Thus, by suppressing the role of Belief in his meditative scenario, Descartes effects the abstraction of Intellect from its more fundamental function as a structurer of Will. Similarly, just as the hesitancy to step is a prelude to skirting the patch, the doubt of given data is an abstraction from nascent variation of Motility, and is not the effecting of detachment from corporeality, as Cartesianism and other doctrines have it.

Will, Epistemology, Foundationalism

Many of Descartes' successors disagree with his thesis that 'I am a thinking being' is the basis of Knowledge. Nevertheless, they remain Cartesians insofar as they conceive Philosophy fundamentally as a project of Epistemological Foundationalism, and insofar as they accept sedentary meditation as the prototype of Philosophical activity. Now, just as every sound itinerary begins with one's current location, every sound plan of action entails a perception of one's given situation. In other words, sedentary meditation is abstracted from its organic involvement in Motility, i. e. from its role in supplying the intellect with information that is essential to its structuring of Motility. Thus, the tradition of Epistemological Foundationalism--Rationalism, Empiricism, Phenomenology, etc.--presupposes and abstracts from the functioning of Will, the self-activation principle of Experience.