Matter and Multiplicity

The neo-Platonists conceive the Indefinite Dyad as the process of producing, out of The One, both Multiplicity and Matter.  However, they offer no clear concept of the relation between the two, other than accepting the Aristotelian concept of the latter as, in itself, characterless 'stuff', and of Multiplicity as an attribute of this stuff.  Hence, following Aristotle, they fail to notice that Matter is also the complement of Form, content that is unified by the latter.  But that means that Multiplicity and Matter are one and the same.  The difficulty in recognizing this identity is rooted in the failure to distinguish the Definite Dyad from the Indefinite Dyad, i. e. between a quantified manifold and an unquantified manifold, the consequence of which is an equivocal use of 'multiplicity', one of which is attributed to the other.  Compounding the difficulty is the traditional association of 'matter' with 'solid particle', an association that persists with the premise that there exists an ultimate particle, i. e. an Atomist premise.