Substance, Modification, Diversification

As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's concept of the modification of Substance must be one of self-modification.  Now, corresponding to the existence of multiple Modes must be multiple instances of the process of Substance Self-Modification.  Furthermore, corresponding to differences between Modes must be a principle of differentiation entailed in each instance of Self-Modification.  Indeed, modification is logically equivalent to differentiation of some given.  In other words, Modes must be the products of a principle of Diversification inhering in Substance, or, equivalently, a principle of Self-Diversification.  If so, then Spinoza repeats what is among the commonest errors in the history of Philosophy--abstracting a concept of Individuation from a concept of Diversification.  He thereby also repeats the failure of not providing of a Principle of Sufficient Reason for a Principle of Individuation, i. e. an explanation of why a substance or a deity would create distinct individual entities beyond itself, a significant failure in an erstwhile Rational system.  In contrast, a justification for Diversification has more recently been offered--according to Darwin, Variation has potential Evolutionary value, i. e. qua Mutation.  So, Spinoza's concept of Modification has potentially far-reaching implications that remain unexplored in what has been a general lack of analysis of it.