Hope, Fear, Power

One of the distinctive features of the Ethics is Spinoza's devaluation of a prevalently esteemed, notably by Kant, emotion--Hope.  As he explains in xii and xiii of the Definitions of the Emotions, in Part III, Hope entails not only uncertainty, but Fear, and, hence, is a partly debilitated condition.  Accordingly, the status of it as a political motivation, i. e. as a response to promises, is on a par with that of Fear--one of dependence, and, hence, of powerlessness, even if Spinoza problematically attempts to confer a Right on it.  So, it is in that context that his depreciation of Hope comes into sharper relief--it is as antithetical to Self-Determination as is Fear.  The further Theological implications of that contrast are resisted by Kant, unsuccessfully, as has been argued here at length earlier.