Revaluation of Pity

The first of Nietzsche's 'revaluation of all values', i. e. his critique of Pity, in The Antichrist, is seemingly less innovative than the title is provocative.  For, as he is undoubtedly well aware, Spinoza's more rigorous, more concise version predates this effort by two centuries.  Instead, what radically diverges from Spinoza's presentation is the thesis that grounds this critique, formulated at the end of Genealogy of Morals--man "would rather will nothingness than not will."  For, while, according to Spinoza, self-destructiveness is impossible, i. e. contradicts the premise that Self-Preservation is the fundamental conatus of all behavior, Nietzsche's thesis, which anticipates Freud's 'Thanatos', explains how it is possible, i. e. how destructive tendencies can be generated from within.  Thus, if, as Spinoza proposes, Pity is a contagious disease, one's susceptibility to it is due to more than an instinct to bond with others, according to Nietzsche's diagnosis.