Heidegger, The Future, Death

It has been proposed here that Temporality is the structure of Retrospection, while what issues forward from any Now is some Spatializing process, e. g. locomotility. It follows that the 'Future' is a hybrid notion--retrospection on a completed projection--as can be confirmed by an examination of any common experience that is usually classified as 'future', e. g. the thought of what one might be doing later in the day is a retrospection on some projected action. Hence, for example, Heidegger's purposive 'ready-to-hand', which he characterizes as essentially 'Temporal', entails the Spatialization of a projection, e. g. a chair is 'that which is to be sat upon'. Underlying that structure is, according to him, a more fundamental a priori idea of the Future--the understanding of one's own death--which he analyzes as the anticipation of "the possibility of the impossibility of existence". Now, if the connection between the entertainment of that possibility and the actual experience of one's death is the product of anything other than empty speculation, Heidegger does not offer any concrete phenomenological data to confirm it. Without such concrete data, the 'anticipation' of that experience is merely abstract posturing with respect to suspended action in general, i. e. it presupposes Spatialization. And, even if Heidegger is espousing a Thanatos Principle, the Death at which it aims entails the carrying out of some action that is a means to it, i. e. it presupposes Spatialization. Such an espousal would be distinguished from Freud's, insofar as it would be an exclusive fundamental principle, not one of several.