Conduct and the Disjunctive Syllogism

While the Modern algebraization of Logic is one main development of Aristotle's original conception of it, perhaps the key substantive alteration is the interpretation of Categorical statements as Hypothetical--'All P are Q' becomes understood as 'If X is P, then X is Q.' Accordingly, the Hypothetical Syllogism--'If ((if X is P, then X is Q, and (if X is Q, then X is R)), then (if X is P, then X is R)'--supplants the Categorical Syllogism--'All P are Q, all Q are R, therefore all P are R. For Peirce, this re-interpretation coheres with his theory of mental activity, which is fundamentally hypothetical. Dewey perhaps best fleshes out Peirce's insight, asserting that mental activity is fundamentally a means to the solution of a problem, and that hypothetical reasoning guides both the determination of the best means to an end, and the consideration of the further consequences of ends. But the Evolvemental conception of Conduct suggests that it is another Logical category that best captures the structure of the mental activity involved in conduct. At any instant of experience, an indefinite number of courses of action are possible, which demonstrates that framing any Conduct is a Disjunctive statement--I can do A, or B, or C, . . ., the resolution of which entails the Disjunctive Syllogism--A or B, not A, therefore B, towards the determination of which, hypothetical reasoning regarding each of the alternatives is directed. The Disjunctive Syllogism has traditionally been taken for granted, perhaps no more crucially so than by Kant. One of the fundamental features of his System is his assertion that Freedom and Pure Practical Reason are identical, and that the latter is expressed by the Categorical Syllogism--'Any Rational being would do A, I am a Rational being, therefor I will do A'--which is the essence of his 'Categorical Imperative'. However, he ultimately realizes, and his System never adequately accommodates, that this Syllogism does not explain why a being would choose to act Rationally, i. e. does not explain the possibility of a more fundamental Freedom, 'willkur', to choose, or, to not choose Rational Freedom ,'Wille'. What he encounters in this Systematic flaw is that the Disjunctive nature of mental activity as it pertains to Conduct, precedes either the Categoricality or Hypotheticality of any subsequent processes.