Selfishness and Altruism

A recurring Moral debate concerns the possibility of Altruism. As the standard argument goes: All behavior is self-interested. Altruism is the benefitting of someone else. Therefore, Altruism is impossible. Instead, according to this analysis, any act that benefits another must have some ulterior selfish motive, either simply to experience a pleasant feeling, or that it is a means to some selfish end. This argument has been especially integral to political positions that reject the legitimacy of collectivist claims. As a result, those positions can only interpret any constraining Moral Principle, e. g. the Golden Rule, adversarially. Even the feeling of Sympathy, which has been advanced by even Adam Smith as the basis of Morality, is still a private experience that has no authority over those in whom it is lacking. Plainly, the foundation of the argument is the Psychological thesis that all behavior is self-interested. Now, certainly, some behavior is, but, on the other hand, it seems difficult to classify a parent's instinctual sacrifice for a child as 'selfish'. Furthermore, two of the most historically influential articulations of the thesis have been misconstrued--it was originally advanced by Hobbes and Smith in the spirit of democratization, i. e. to counter the Psychological premises of the time that buttressed the era's social hierarchy, e. g. the innateness of Nobility, not to fragment society. Still, its effectiveness as a social atomizer has been undeniable. In contrast, the Formaterial concept of the Individual rejects that Psychological thesis, because it entails that gregariousness, and, hence, Other-interestedness, is intrinsic in the Individual. And, the Evolvemental Phronetic Principle rejects the mutual exclusivity of Selfishness and Altruism: Conduct that is exclusively one or the other is simply of a narrower scope than that which integrates elements of both, and, hence, is less Evolved than the latter. Thus, this Principle agrees with Utilitarianism to the extent that the Phronetic value of Conduct is measured by degree of scope, not by type.