Material Cause

Aristotle's concept 'Material Cause' might sound peculiar to more modern ears because the notion 'cause' has dynamic connotations, while 'material' is usually regarded as passive. Aristotle himself does not help resolve this seeming contradiction, citing as examples of Material Causes the bronze of a statue, and the letters of a word. More likely, this category is his half-hearted accommodation of the dynamic Materialism of some of his predecessors, a doctrine which he rejects. His 'bronze' is far removed from the dynamic Water of Thales, which the latter chose as his fundamental principle because of its life-engendering power. One basic problem here is the difficulty in defining Matter, an intrinsic difficulty, since Matter is essentially indefinite. But there is a way to define it without rendering it definite. 'Form' can be most generally defined as the Unity of a Multiplicity. So, conversely, 'Matter' can be most generally defined as the Multiplicity of a Unity. Likewise, just as 'Formal Cause' can be defined as the generation of Unity in a Multiplicity, 'Material Cause' can be defined as the generation of Multiplicity in a Unity. And, insofar as in either of the latter cases the process of the relevant generation is immanent, i. e. not imposed from without, these can be referred to as 'Formal Principle' and 'Material Principle', respectively.