Prescriptive and Descriptive Ethics

One standard topic in academic Philosophy is 'Descriptive Ethics', which is a seemingly oxymoronic title. For, while a description is an account of what has already occurred, Ethics is fundamentally concerned with conduct that has yet to transpire. Ethics would seem, rather, to be essentially Prescriptive, insofar as it recommends, advises, or commands possible future behavior. For example, the Ten Commandments are plainly prescriptive. And, yet, what probably the three most prominent Moral Philosophers, Aristotle, Kant, and, Mill, each seems to offer is a Descriptive Ethics. In Aristotle's analysis, everybody naturally seeks the greatest Good, Happiness. Kant, often taken to be a Prescriptive Ethicist, actually only clarifies, articulates, and justifies the 'Categorical Imperative' that people experience as Conscience. Likewise, Mill's 'Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number' principle is an attempt to explain what is in fact Moral experience. A noteworthy challenge to this eminent tradition of Descriptive Ethics in Philosophy is from Nietzsche. One application of his provocatively expressed distinction between 'Master' and 'Slave' Moralities, is to Prescriptive and Descriptive, respectively. For a Master Morality creates, while a Slave Morality follows, and those are precisely how, respectively, Prescriptive Ethics and Descriptive Ethics present themselves. In contrast, Nietzsche urged future Philosophers to be 'legislators', which he himself attempted to exemplify. His fundmental Ethical principle, 'Act only in such a way that you can will its eternal recurrence', for whatever it is worth substantively, is unabashedly his own prescription.