Why?

When people ask 'Why?', there are apparently two different sorts of answers. When answering 'Why did the tree fall down?' with 'It was struck by lightning.,' the latter supplies what is generally called a 'cause'. But when answering 'Why is he running?' with 'He wants to catch a bus.', a 'purpose' is being offered. Aristotle called them both 'causes', distinguishing between an 'efficient cause' and a 'final cause', respectively. In contrast, Kant's general term is 'reason', drawing the distinction between 'theoretical reason' as the source of scientific hypotheses, and 'practical reason' as the generator of conscious intentions. Regardless of the terminology, a defining contrast is between what preceded the event in question versus what that event will lead to. While this distinction clearly separates the two, on some crucial occasions they are in conflict. In jurisprudential situations there are frequently disputes as to whether or not what transpired was due to a cause or to a purpose. In a murder trial, for example, the prosecution would likely argue that the killing was done, say, in order to get someone out of the way, while the defense could respond that a genetic irregularity, a chemical imbalance, or extenuating circumstances, led to the fatal behavior. In such a case, the decision will likely hang on which type of answer to 'why?' prevails. But this conflict is not localized; it is an instance of a more general debate over the nature of human motivation--antecedent physical causes vs. conscious intention, a debate that is so sophisticated that each side can explain away the opposition. The physicalist often argues that consciousness itself has no motive power, and merely assists those non-conscious drives. Contrarily, intentionalists maintain that the diagnosis of physical causes serves to inform conscious responses to a problem. Interestingly, both Aristotle and Kant implicitly suggest a third explanation of human motivation. Both offer principles for the control of the physical part of a human by the rational part. Such rational self-control would seem to be neither cause nor purpose, since it is effected not prior nor consequent to action, but constantly in the developing course of it.