Democracy and Responsibility

It is commonly believed that if a member of a Democracy does not vote, they might be foolishly missing an opportunity to influence the general condition, but not that they are evading a responsibility to do so.  But, entailed in such a belief is the concept of the Individual as essentially independent of Society, a concept rooted in that of the supernatural Soul that is a cardinal feature of Medieval Theology.  In contrast, on the premises that every Person is a part of Humankind, and that a Society is only as strong as its weakest Member, each citizen in a Democracy does have a Responsibility to every other, and to the Polity as a whole, to participate in the processes that define it as such.  So, whether or not there is a Responsibility to vote in a Democracy depends on some fundamental presuppositions that are rarely addressed in common conversation.

Dissent, Negation, Variation

The integration of None of the Above into the electoral process transforms Dissent from mere symbolic gesture to active catalyst for change.  But, the negative formulation is misleading: it more precisely calls for Something Different.  In other words, it is not a Dialectical moment, as Marxists would interpret it, but a principle of Variation.  Nevertheless, what Marx perhaps best discerns, more in the French Revolution than in the American, is that the ruled, rather than the rulers, have become the motor of History.

Democracy and None of the Above

If a proposed None of the Above were to receive the most votes, then the election would be required to be re-run, with all those who were outpolled no longer eligible.  With that Dissent option, the disenchanted would be more likely to participate, and parties would be more responsive, thereby improving the presumed Democracy. On the other hand, some might object that with the possibility of an inconclusive outcome, scheduling would become unwieldy.  However, that objection confuses an efficiently conducted Democracy with a Democracy corrupted by expediency, a line arguably crossed in the 2000 election.  Anyway, if party machinery wants to not be inconvenienced, it can preempt any re-run by putting up candidates who are responsive to the interests of voters, not candidates to which voters have no choice but to adapt themselves.

Election Day and Heterocracy

In comparison with that of virtually every other case hitherto, the history of regime-change in the American Experiment has been remarkably stable, with nothing but seamless transitions.  On the other hand, its system is less flexible than those in many polities that have adopted its basic Democratic model, because unlike in those, there is no routine option of dissolving the regime and calling for elections prior to the next scheduled date.  Indeed, evidence that the stability has become sclerotic includes intransigence in considering a change of Election Day to a more convenient weekend day, and the priority of deadlines over a conscientious counting of votes in the 2000 election.  Such privileging of impersonal procedure over acts of Consent and their tabulation is characteristic of Heterocracy, rather than of Democracy.

Voting, Consent, Dissent

What distinguishes Democracy from other systems is the Consent of the Ruled; in all other cases, Rule is imposed, even if benevolent.  Now, a Vote expresses a double Consent--for a candidate, and for the process. Thus, a vote for a third-party candidate does not adequately express a disenchantment with the process. Nor does not voting, which is tantamount to not resisting being imposed upon.  So, the only medium of potentially effective Dissent would be a None of the Above option in every case, with a range of consequences corresponding to the total of that option defined in advance, e. g. a level that would force a new election, possibly with different candidates.

The Right to Not Vote

Perhaps if it had occurred to the Founding Fathers that their experiment in Democracy would be disrupted by a widespread neglect of the opportunity to vote, they might have added a Bill of Responsibilities to the Constitution that includes mandatory voting.  An alleged 'right' to not vote could not, therefore, be a Constitutionally guaranteed Right.  Furthemore, if there is such a thing as a 'natural' Right to not exercise a Right to vote, it is unclear what its ground might be, especially insofar as it seems to lack any corresponding Responsibility.  Now, a refusal to vote, on the ground that the available options are products of an un-Democratic process, e. g. one conditioned by Plutocratic principles, seems substantive. But, that corruption could be rectified by 'none of the above' being offered as an alternative.  Regardless, between the continued difficulties in protecting the universal Right to vote, and the popular assumption that there is a 'right' to not vote, it seems unlikely that this dimension of the deficiency in universal suffrage will be addressed any time soon.

Voting, Right, Responsibility

In many contexts, Right and Responsibility are conjoined concepts.  One in which they are not is Modern Political Philosophy, in which Right is typically a cardinal principle, while Responsibility is hardly ever more than vaguely alluded to. For example, in the U. S. Constitution, there is a Bill of Rights, but no Bill of Responsibilities.  Correspondingly, there is a Right to Vote, but no Responsibility to Vote.  Now, the occasionally proposed making voting mandatory, with 'none of the above' as an option, has usually been met with a hostility that is groundless, even though such a measure would make voter engagement and candidate responsiveness routine in the American political process.  That possibility only exposes the significant deficiencies in actual approximations to 'Democracy' in the American Experiment.