Psyche and Reason

As has been previously discussed, Freud restores to the Psyche a sub-Rationality that Aristotle recognizes, but, that under the influence of Christianity, gets purged.  Now, since Aristotle attributes a Soul to all living entities, but only Rationality to humans, Descartes' identification of Mind and Soul entails that humans are the only biological entities that possess a Soul, i. e. he conceives each other animal to be a mechanical automaton.  But, Freud gives no indication of attributing a Psyche to any non-human entities.  So, it is unclear if he is following Descartes in that regard, or is implicitly following Aristotle, and, for example, implicitly attributing a Libido to biological entities.  If the latter, then the significant divergence from Aristotle is that he conceives Reason to repress, rather than to enhance, the non-Rational parts of the Psyche.

Psyche, Soul, Body

'Psyche' means 'Soul', so Freud's concept of the former is part of the long and complicated history of the latter.  Plato and Aristotle agree that the Soul has three parts, which can be conceived as vegetative, locomotive, and rational.  However, they diverge regarding the Soul-Body relation--the former conceives them as separable, the latter as Form-Matter, and, hence, as is inseparable.  Now, Christianity adopts the Platonist version, but without attending to one of its apparent coherences--incorporeality, yet, containing vegetative and locomotive dimensions.  In contrast, Descartes resolves that problem by purging the Soul of those parts, leaving it as equivalent to Mind, a concept that dominates for centuries, including when Mind is conceived as Consciousness.  So, Freud's Id restores those dimensions to the Soul, though without distinguishing them.  However, he offers no clear concept of the Soul-Body relation, leaving his theory open to both Epiphenomenal and Physicalist interpretations.

Conscience, Superego, Superid

Freud's Superego coordinates the relation between the Ego and a Group by interalizing the force of the latter.  When that force is represented as a set of values, it is conceived as 'Morality', with the Superego as 'conscience'.  Accordingly, one's Ego is the locus of a battleground between one's Id and the Group, usually resulting in the repression and sublimation of the latter, though with some residual discontent.  However, this scheme does not account for the concept of Conscience that is connoted in 'conscientious objector'.  For, what is expressed in the latter is not repressed Id, but a discontent with the current Group, on the basis of the values of a different collective organization, for example, that of a Socialist to the dehumanization that is the norm in a Capitalist society.  In such cases, Conscience is an expression of the Superid, i. e. of a Species-principle, in the face of a degenerating mode of organization.

Superid and Psyche

The Superid is not one drive among others in the Id, it is the very Psyche itself.  It is the fundamental Species-principle, e. g. Will to Live, Will to Power, Will to Evolve, etc., localized in one of its members.  Accordingly, Freud's main structures are three general intra-Psychic functions.  The Id is localized modes of the principle, e. g. nutrition, reproduction, etc.  The Ego unifies the manifold of the drives in the Id.  The Superego coordinates the Ego with other Egos, i. e. integrates it with society.  Thus, Conscience is fundamentally the Superid, and not necessarily the Superego--it can be the voice of society, as well as, as Heidegger conceives it, that of one's Ego.  Thus, since social formations are contingent, so, too, are the contents of the Superego--not only ideological norms, but taboos such as that of incest, as well.   Likewise uncertain is whether any of Freud's familiar objects of Psychoanalytic interest is more than a contingent condition.

Morality, Will to Power, Superid

The concept of Morality that Freud ascribes to the Superego is primarily what Nietzsche calls a Morality of Mores, i. e.  a set of conventional norms.  But, the extension of the concept to the Morality of Autonomy can be problematic.  For example, while the Deontological dimension of Kant's principle, as he himself shows, is derivable from convention, qua Pure Reason, it is self-generated.  Likewise, Aristotle's Mean is essentially a homeostatic principle.  But, a greater challenge is not from a variety of Rationalism, rather from Nietzsche's Will to Power, one expression of which is a drive to Self-Overcome, which can explain not only Autonomy, but the transcending of oneself towards benefiting others.  Indeed, since the Will to Power is the fundamental instinct in any entity, this source of Morality could be classified as what Marcuse briefly calls, though for other purposes, the Superid.

Group and Beyond Good and Evil

In Freudian terms, Nietzsche's concept of 'Beyond Good and Evil', Ego is the source of its own Superego, i. e. one gives oneself rules of conduct.  That structure can also apply to the members of collectives such as Kant's Kingdom of Ends, and Socialism.  Now, in Freud's concept of a basic Group, the leader functions as Superego to the Egos that are its members.  But, in one variation of a Group, a Mass, i. e. a mob, the leader functions as Ego, while the Egos of its members are dissolved, and they become pure Ids.  So, absent any Superego, the source of standards of Good and Evil, a Mass has also been characterized as 'Beyond Good and Evil'--because no rules of conduct are observed by anyone involved--thus not in the sense intended by Nietzsche.  This misrepresentation of Nietzsche's phrase has been instrumental in some subsequent horrors, as well as some less deadly abuses.

Psyche and Group

According to Freud's concept of a 'group', interpersonal bonds are the products of sexual drives that have been repressed and sublimated.  Accordingly, Civilization is possible only if repression prevents anarchy, and, perhaps, Hobbesian universal war.  Now, Marcuse's divergence from that analysis accepts the premise that Group-formation is not inherent in a Psyche, though he allows for the possibility of non-repressive sublimation, i. e. under non-alienated economic conditions.  He, thus, accepts, without further analysis, the premise that the sexual drive is a merely individual process.  However, as has been previously discussed, that premise is inadequate, since sexuality is, in fact, part of the reproductive process of the Species, and, hence, an aspect of a governing Species-principle, e. g. Will to Live, Will to Power, etc.  Furthermore, included in any such principle is an instinct to optimal organization that motivates its members.  Hence, contrary to thesis of both Freud and Marcuse, Group-formation is not extrinsic to the Psyche.