Vision, Enlightenment, Grasp, Empowerment

His words "mirror" and "point of view", and the etymology of his "perspective", are all indications that Leibniz' model of human experience privileges Vision.  So, because of the systematic relation between Vision and Light, that privileging locates the model in the tradition in which Enlightenment is the experiential ideal.  Now, 'concept' and 'comprehension' are etymologically rooted in 'grasp', but, insofar as, as is traditionally the case, they refer to incorporeal operations, their genealogy is ungrounded.  Even Whitehead's 'prehension', which he equates with mere 'feeling', falls short of a distinctive alternative to the traditional model.  In contrast, in Marxism, with its recognition of tool-wielding as the distinguishing characteristic of the human species, and in Darwinism, according to which the human hand is a decisive factor in its evolutionary ascendancy, there are the rudiments of a more radical alternative.  In that model, Grasp supplants Vision as the privileged experience, and, as the image 'the reins of power' suggests, Empowerment supplants Enlightenment as the goal.

Grasp and Transcendence

Via Grasp, one has immediate and concrete access to facets of an object that are beyond one's perspective of it, and are within that of another.  Now, according to Leibniz, a Perspective is a "mirror" of the universe.  But, a human can more than mirror the universe--one can change it, as well.  So, Grasp signifies the transcendence of Perspective in two respects--Cognitively and Practically.

Grasp, Theory, Practice

Humans are not the only organisms that can grasp objects due to the possession of a thumb that opposes digits, and their grasp is not necessarily as strong as others.  Instead, what is distinctive in the human grasp is its degree of precision, the result of which is that the human hand can more accurately mold itself to the surface of a held object, and can more easily manipulate an object.  In other words, the human grasp is more highly evolved both as a cognition and as as dexterous, i. e. as a mode both of Theory and of Practice.

Grasp and Prehension

While 'grasp' is frequently used in casual conversation to indicate an act of intelligence, perhaps the closest to a rigorous employment of it is Whitehead's 'prehension'.  However, his usage of the term strays from its literal meaning.  For, first, in his system, a 'prehension' is the analogue of a perception in Leibniz' system, the perspectival character of which, as has been previously discussed, can be transcended by an act of grasping.  Second, his misuse of the term is evident in his classification of a 'feeling' as a 'prehension', i. e. to grasp something is more than to merely have contact with it, just as a feeler is not a claw.  In other words, he shares with Leibniz the shortcoming of excluding from his system physiological actions, one of which is Prehension = Grasp.  And, because also thereby excluded is specifically tool-grasping, the terminological imprecision can be interpreted by a Marxist as an expression of Class-prejudice.

Perspectivism and Grasp

Perspectivism seems to entail that the objects of Perception can inherently be no more than facets of things.  However, plainly transcending that limitation is the act of grasping something, in which it is possible that all the facets of a thing are simultaneously objects of Perception.  Now, a common Experience in which Grasping is fundamental is that which, according to Marx, is the distinctively Human activity--using an implement.  So, a significant limitation of Perspectivism is that it is inadequate to a very basic, and perhaps cardinal, physiological process.

Species and Mathematics

There is little evidence that entities other than humans possess Mathematical knowledge.  Now, one traditional explanation of that state-of-affairs is that Mathematics is a divine dimension of Reality, the cognition of which requires the kind of Intellect that only humans among created beings possess.  In contrast, according to the Kantian tradition, the latter clause suffices as an explanation, and there are no grounds for positing the independent existence of Mathematical structures the contemplation of which is a mere mirror.  Furthermore, a post-Kantian thesis asserts that those structures are fundamentally quantificational, of profound use in activities from simple enumeration or distribution, to complicated applied Science.  In other words, on that interpretation, Mathematics is specific to the Species, and is Practical, not, as tradition has it, divine and Theoretical.  Leibniz' projection of a Mathematical language that is "universal" in the Species, locates him at the beginning of the transition to the secularization of Mathematics.

Egalitarianism and Species

Debates about Egalitarianism tend to be abstract, and, as has been previously discussed, equivocal.  Perhaps the only case in which the issue is concrete is in the determination of whether or not a transfer from A, who has more of something, to B, who has less of it, is justified.  In other words, Egalitarianism is a sub-topic in the topic of Justice.  Now, most of the arguments in the proto-scenario are familiar, though one that is rarely aired in the U. S., i. e. in disputes over taxation, is that the apparently initial inequality is itself the product of an arbitrary distribution.  But, regardless of the merits of arguments on both sides, they tend to share a fundamental premise--that the locus of the dispute is two individuals.  In contrast, if the locus is, instead, the Species, then the terms are completely transformed, and the uncertainty is merely over which arrangement is better for the Species, one resolution of which is simply that it depends on the circumstances.  In other words, the presumed cardinality of the debate over Egalitarianism is completely dissolved by a re-framing of the usual terms of the debate.