Philosophy, Marxism, Practice

As Marx attends to the distinction between Philosophy as interpreting the world, and Philosophy as changing the world, he overlooks another distinction that is implicit therein--that between changing the world, and a specifically Philosophical mode of changing the world. Now, the distinctively Philosophical dimension of Marxism is Dialectical Materialism. But, that system never functions as more than an interpretation of the world, even when applied to future events. What it is not applied to is the specifically Practical dimension of the doctrine, crystallized as the Ten Planks in the Manifesto. For those proposals are as randomly organized a mere list as are the Ten Commandments. In contrast, the paradigms of specifically Practical Philosophy are the principles articulated by Kant and Mill, each of which is applicable in each and every experience, and from the former of which is derived a system of duties. On the basis of those models, a distinctively Philosophical presentation of the Ten Planks would be methodically organized, beginning with the formulation of a fundamental Practical principle, followed by a derivation of any other proposition, e. g. a demonstration of 'Abolish private property' as following from 'Conduct oneself in accordance with the General Will', perhaps via an application of Dialectical Logic. As is, Marxism in its Practical dimension is not a Philosophical doctrine.

Practical Consciousness and Necessity

As has been previously discussed, Practical Consciousness is constituted by attention guiding physiological motion. Now, such attention is not required in habitual behavior, in which an outcome arrives, under normal circumstances, as expected. Where it is required is when habit is either not established, e. g. in a novel experience, or is inadequate to the circumstances, e. g. in which unusual factors, such as illness, intervene. So, the outcome of Practical Consciousness is essentially uncertain, even if intended. which can explain why Practice is depreciated in the Cartesian tradition. Likewise, a significant problem for Marxism is that either Revolution is not a product of Practical Consciousness, or else it is not governed by historical Necessity.

Self-Consciousness and Practical Consciousness

A common instance of self-consciousness, rarely recognized as such, is when one pays attention to what one is doing. In such cases, one is not merely observing what one is doing, one guides it, as if one were carrying out a set of instructions. Hence, in the process, Consciousness functions as a cause of behavior. Thus, this Self-Consciousness can be classified as Practical Consciousness, in contrast with the mere Consciousness of Practice. Now, the physiological motions that can be affected by this guidance are not only those of the limbs, but of the sense organs as well, e. g. keeping one's eyes and ears trained on some object. Hence, in the 'consciousness' of an outer object, there are distinct strata that are often conflated in some theories of Perception, such as in the Phenomenological one adopted by Marx-Engels. The suppressed distinction also signifies the main shortcoming in their concept of Practice.

Consciouness and Others

A common use of the term 'self-conscious' is to one's concern for how one appears to others, applicable to most looks in a mirror. Implicit in that usage is the attribution of Consciousness to others. Thus, there is a distinction between the awareness of oneself in association with others, and one of oneself in association with others who possess their own such awareness. Now, Consciousness, which is inherently "for me", as conceived by Marx-Engels, cannot recognize the latter possibility, which entails an in-itself existence, and so lacks the capacity to account for a concept of Self-Consciousness that even in Capitalist conditions, transcends an egocentric orientation. Furthermore, their concept thus also lacks the capacity to distinguish between conscious beings and inanimate objects. It, therefore, includes no ground for the elimination of the treatment of the former as the latter, i. e. of the exploitation of others, which is a necessary condition of their concept of Socialism.

Consciousness and Selfishness

According to Marx-Engels, the fundamental object of Consciousness is oneself in some relation with others.  Now, because that relation is indeterminate, and the Consciousness is "growing", a range of structures is possible, including that of one as a member of an exploited Proletariat, i. e. Class-Consciousness.  Still, regardless of the stage of development therein, Consciousness is inherently "for me", according to this concept of it, perhaps a Phenomenological one adopted from Hegel.  Hence, it is an inherently egocentric one, and, thus, in the service of Selfishness.  Yet, they do not seem to recognize that it may be an historically contingent one, a likely product of a Capitalist society, that itself requires revolutionizing, if the Consciousness of living in a Socialist society is not to remain a reactionary factor.

Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Society

Marx-Engels assert of Consciousness that it is of "other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious".  So, in other words, they identify Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, as opposed to, say, Hegel, who distinguishes them.  And, therefore, their concept is one that is essentially social, in significant contrast with, notably Descartes',  However, the concept of Self-Consciousness as essentially social is not exclusive to Materialism--neither Kant's, in his Refutation of Idealism, nor Heidegger's Being-in-the-World, each implicitly social, is Materialist.  Regardless, nothing in Marx-Engels' formulation of Self-Consciousness includes Practice qua Purposiveness; rather, it entails only association with others, which can be for its own sake.  Hence, rather than as another means to the survival of the individual, Self-Consciousness can also be interpreted as a manifestation of a Formal Species-principle, the main function of which is to integrate its otherwise randomly compresent members.

Consciousness and Practice

According to Marx-Engels, Consciousness is a distinctively human characteristic the fundamental function of which is social and practical.  Their exposition of the concept in the German Ideology includes the following analysis:  "Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into 'relations' with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all.  For the animal, its relation to other does not exist as a relation."  Now, the "for me" signifies a concept of Consciousness that is either Phenomenological or Epiphenomenal, in contrast with concepts in which the object of Consciousness is no mere appearance, but a reality, in itself.  So, implicit in the Consciousness of a relation is that it represents some indeterminable Species interaction, from which it follows that Class Consciousness is no more than a special case of such an representation, and that 'Revolution' is only an interpretation of some Species activity, as is the attribution to it of 'Necessity'.  But, the deeper problem for them is that such a concept of Consciousness lacks causal efficacy, so no Consciousness, and no degree of development of Class Consciousness, suffices to motivate the Proletariat to Revolution.  In other words, their concept of Consciousness may be a Consciousness of Practice, but it is not a Practical Consciousness.