Will, Utilitarianism, Libertarianism

While Moore, Kantianism, and Dewey offer significant criticisms of Utilitarianism, perhaps the most decisive one comes from elsewhere in the oeuvre of Mill himself. For, in contrast with the descriptivist Universalism of his Utilitarianism, is the prescriptivist Individualism of his own Libertarian doctrine. In the few passages in which he seems to recognize that conflict, he accords priority to Utilitarianism, i. e. by arguing that even personal freedom is conditioned by its consequences for general happiness. In so doing, however, he briefly exposes the prescriptivism of his Utilitarianism, i. e. by arguing that, in some circumstances, one should not perform an entertained possible action. In the process, he, furthermore, reveals how Utilitarianism entails Will. For, the argument that one should consider more than one's own interests entails that one should extend oneself towards as many others as possible, i. e. will is the principle of self-extending in Experience.

Will and Utilitarianism

According to Utilitarianism, the value of an act is determined by its consequences, specifically the subsequent pleasure and pain that it causes. As is widely recognized, the prime target of this Consequentialism is Kantianism, for which the value of an act is determined by the antecedents that motivate it. Less appreciated is that Utilitarianism precludes the possibility that Will, i. e. the performance itself of the act, can be a bearer of value. One problem that that preclusion presents to the doctrine is that the performance itself can be pleasurable. Furthermore, even if that pleasure were to be classified as a 'consequence' of the performance, it still does not take into account how that pleasure can be a function of some antecedents of the performance--e. g. to what extent the performance is innovative in the biography of the performer, whether or not it is an accomplishment of what was initially intended, etc. Hence, Utilitarianism does not, and, apparently, cannot account for at least some of the pleasure involved in the performance of an act.

Will and Sympathy

'Sympathy' is typically spoken of as if it were a unitary feeling that forges a bond between two people. However, it is actually an experience that rapidly combines four distinct moments. First, one extends oneself towards another. Second, one comprehends their projected situation. Third, one emotionally reacts to that comprehension. Finally, one compares that emotion with that evinced by the other. Hence, Sympathy denotes not a feeling, but a similarity of feelings. Furthermore, it does not create a bond between two people, but is an expression of Will, i. e. of the original extending of oneself towards another. Accordingly, insofar as Morality is construed as consisting in the forging of interpersonal fellowship, and Sympathy is conceived to be the basis of that forging, Will is the foundation of Morality.

Will and Altruism

Initially, an encounter is an obstacle to Motility, i. e. to Will, but it can develop as an opportunity for novelty. Similarly, an encounter with another person begins as interference, but with the potential for growth, via access to an otherwise inconceivable perspective. Thus, in contrast with traditional concepts of 'will' as an expression of Selfishness, Will, here, is not only enhanced by benefiting others, but is the very ground of altruistic conduct.

Will and Prejudice

In some circumstances, the assertion 'We are all the same inside' is an expression of a metaphysical doctrine, i. e. that a single substance, e. g. Mind, underlies a diversity of its manifestations. But, more usually, it is offered as a corrective to prejudicial behavior. As such, it is based on the presumption that the hatred of differences is best treated by the denial of Difference. Plainly, to prescribe the denial of difference to cure the hate of Difference only validates the hate-ability of it. In contrast, the non-evasive corrective to the hatred of Difference is the cultivation of an appreciation of it. In other words, the effective cure of prejudice entails the cultivation of Will, the mode of comportment towards another qua other. It also may entail a rejection of metaphysical Monism, insofar as such a doctrine is the source of antipathy towards Difference.

Will and Duties Towards Others

Rational agents are equal before Kant's Moral Law. Hence, the distinction that he draws between duties towards oneself and duties towards others is problematic within his system. The very distinction between self and others presupposes a principle of Differentiation in Experience, i. e. Will. On that basis, the fundamental duty towards another consists in a cultivation of respect for them qua other, i. e. a cultivation of Will as being-towards-others. Non-interference in the Freedom of another is one expression of that respect, to which the closest that Kant can approximate is non-interference in the Freedom of a rational being, who must remain anonymous, according to his rational principle.

Will and Other as End-in-itself

Kant sometimes conceives an other as an 'end-in-itself', the promotion of whose happiness is one's duty, a duty which one does not have towards oneself. This concept is the product of a questionable teleological representation of Freedom, beginning with an inference from the prohibition of interference in Freedom, to the obligation to promote the happiness of the possessor of Freedom, i. e. that of a rational agent. On empirical grounds alone, the inference is invalid, because the promotion of the happiness of an other can sometimes support their Freedom, e. g. the provision of food can strengthen them, but can, on other occasions, amount to the same indulgence that seems to be Kant's reason for not obligating one to promote one's own happiness. More likely, the inference is based on his thesis that a rational agent 'deserves' Happiness, a thesis which, as has been argued previously, questionably presupposes that the happiness of an individual is of interest to impersonal Reason. So, absent the admirable but unconvincing teleological interpretation of Freedom, an other, to Kant, is a self-activating entity, i. e. is a possessor of Will.