Rationalism, Empiricism, Incorporealism

If the standard American academic Philosophy curriclum is any indication, the Modern era begins when Descartes breaks from Medieval dogmatism, and establishes the Cogito as the foundation of Philosophical endeavor.  Then, in response, Locke insists on the irreducibility of Sense-Experience, thereby setting in motion the Rationalism vs. Empiricism dynamic, typified by the exchanges between Locke and Leibniz.  But, this narrative is deficient in two main respects, with a common root.  First, it abstracts the Meditations from Discourse on Method, thereby suppressing that antedating the latter is Bacon's formulation of Method, which as an autonomous, corporeal activity, constitutes a more profound break from Medievalism than does the incorporeal Cogito.  In other words, the original Rationalism of the era is Experimental Reason, i. e. constituted by instrument-aided methodical procedures of producing and measuring effects. So, too, is the original Empiricism Experimentalist, from which Locke et al. abstract the mere observation of an object falling, from the deliberate dropping of it for the purpose of measuring it.  As a result, Modern Philosophy reverts to Medieval Incorporealism.

Political Philosophy and the United States

The arrival of the United States, as expressed in the Constitution, presents a counter-example to much of the preceding Political Philosophy.  It is a product of collective construction, a response to specific historical circumstances, dubbed an "experiment" because of its uncertain future.  In that context, ideas such as Freedom have value not as absolute truths, but as sound building materials.  Likewise, that it might be a response to biological need does not guarantee modal Necessity of success as a viable social organization.  And, it demonstrates what gets suppressed in Plato's leap from a vision of the Idea of Good to the effecting of social harmony--Reason that is both Techne and Experimental.

Experimentalism and Political Philosophy

In Process and Reality, Whitehead mentions Bacon only twice, and very briefly.  In both cases, it is to criticize Bacon for ignoring the value of Speculation in the pursuit of Knowledge, though absent in these passages is any reference to Bacon's novel, New Atlantis, arguably the first work of Modern Political Philosophy.  On the other hand, he elsewhere brands as "cooking the books" Dewey's Experimentalism, the pioneer of which is--Bacon.  Now, Whitehead is far from alone in under-appreciating Bacon--it is perhaps the only thing contemporary Philosophy and Political Science academic departments have in common.  Accordingly, little consideration, at least prior to Dewey, has been given to the characterization of the formation of the United States as an "experiment", to which mainstream Political Philosophy, neither Ancient nor Modern, seems adequate.

Organism, Ecologism, Supernaturalism

Heliocentrism entails the end of Geocentrism, which entails the end of Anthropocentrism.  Arising out of Heliocentrism has been Ecologism, the first significant systematic recognition of which has been Darwinism, which imbeds Human History in Natural History.  Plato's World-Soul is potentially Ecologic, but he does not pursue the consequences of a Philosopher-King, on the basis of a vision of the Idea of the Good, including Human-Environment relations in his project of harmonization.  Now, the formidable resistance to Ecology has been varieties of Supernaturalism, according to which Humans are fundamentally separable from any Ecosystem.  One example of that resistance is Leibniz' Monadology, according to which a Monad is essentially unaffected by its environment.  In contrast, Whitehead does allow that an Organism is a product of its Environment.  But, by excluding from Actuality any process of modification by an Organism of its Environment, he, implicitly, even if not completely, continues the Supernaturalist resistance to Ecologism.

Organism and Prehension

Whitehead's Actuality is constituted by processes of intake from its environment by an Organism, which is itself at any moment the culmination of prior intakes.  But, lacking in this scheme is Motility, as if only certain plants were Organisms.  Now, a general term that he uses to characterize these events is Prehension.  However, he does not seem to recognize that Prehension means Grasp, which entails Motility, i. e. a hand enfolding some object.  To so recognize it is to also recognize that in the Organisms with capacity for Grasp, it is not a termination of a process but a preparation for further Motility, e. g. wielding a tool.  He is thus precluded from considering that a fundamental moment in the experience of an Organism is that it modifies its environment, not merely takes from it.

Organism, Process, Political Philosophy

Whitehead conceives a Leibnizian Monad as both a Process and an Organism.  However, he does not explain the application of a dynamic concept of Organism to the traditional one, to which, as a living Whole of Parts, duration seems inessential.  One possible exception, though, is Aristotle's, according to which it is in the pursuit of an End that the parts of a body are both animated and unified.  So, writ large, a Polity that is both an Organism and a Process is one that harmonizes its citizen by the pursuit of a common Good.  Now, typically throughout history, such a unifier of a society has been a potential enemy, if not an actual conflict.  But, a Leader who is acting on the basis of a vision of the Idea of the Good is one who would transcend the particularity of an End that is contingent on animosity.  So, an extension of Whitehead's concept of dynamic Organism to Political Philosophy yields a criticism of the particularity of most prior models of the best Polity.  But, insofar as Leibniz does not recognize Monads as collectively constituting an Organism, Whitehead might not approve of such an extension.

Leadership, History, Cosmopolity

If the Idea of the Good in the Republic is identical to the World-Soul of the Timaeus, then the Polis harmonized by the Philosopher-King, in accordance with a vision of the Idea of the Good, can be either only a Cosmopolity, or a more localized Polity in transition to be incorporated in an eventual more comprehensive entity.  But, it is not until Kant, Hegel, and Marx that the historicization of Political Philosophy begins to be considered.  Accordingly, all prior Political Philosophy, Ancient and Modern, has become obsolete in many of its details, e. g. that self-preservation is the sole motivation for an individual human entering into association with others.  Likewise, not taking into consideration that an effective Sovereign must have, as has previously discussed, diachronic Leadership qualities, i. e. by means of which a local Polity might constitute an episode in the historical progression towards a Cosmopolity, is a deficiency in those models.