Locomotility and Will to Grow

According to the almost universally accepted concept of Psychology, Locomotility functions as a means to an end, in which the end is a representation of a correction of some problem in the given situation, e. g. the representation of drinking water, as a correction to thirst, that initiates motion towards water.  Implicit in that model is that Locomotility requires some representation to initiate it, and, hence, lacks autonomy.  Or, in other words, if need never arose, the organism would remain in one place.  Now, the fundamental flaw with this model is suggested by Nietzsche--it is a Psychology of Weakness, of behavior that is only ever a reaction to some deficiency, in contrast with which is the Psychology of Strength, which consists in a spontaneous surplus of energy.  Similarly, the Will to Live consists in the effort to remain alive in the face of threats, whereas the Will to Grow, often experienced as a feeling of restlessness, is constantly pushing beyond achieved levels.  So, Locomotility can be conceived as the fundamental manifestation of the Will to Grow, and, hence, as autonomous.  Thus, for example, Marcuse's model of Socialism, which, as derived from a gratification-seeking, i. e. end-orientated, impulse, Eros, is an expression of a Psychology of Weakness.

Locomotility and Will

It is Kant's initial ambition to develop a concept of Will as equivalent to Pure Practical Reason, i. e. in which the latter is the cause of Locomotility.  However, the plan runs aground when he discovers that even a Categorical Imperative can be resisted, with the source of resistance a second type of Will, one which has the capacity to choose between obedience and disobedience.  And, despite his own, and those of subsequent followers, efforts to somehow eliminate this surd from his system, they arguably do not succeed, which means that only it has the power to initiate Locomotility.  In other words, Will is actually Locomotility itself, i. e. the power of setting oneself in motion, which Kant attempts to suppress by absorbing it into Reason, in the same way that many, including Aristotle, Freud, and Marcuse, do when trying to absorb it into some representation of a Vegetative need.

Locomotility and Play

Exertion is proof of the autonomy of Locomotility.  Usually integrated into a behavioral sequence that begins with some representation, and ends in some course of action, in this moment, Locomotility is spontaneously initiated, and is independent of the activity that it is intended to enhance.  Concepts like impulse and drive, which connote motion, suppress this spontaneity, typically by absorbing it into a preceding representation that is equated with some necessary organic process.  For example, Hunger is usually conceived as Vegetative need that automatically sets in motion the search for food, a concept that obscures the distictions between an empty stomach, hunger pangs that signal a problem, and the locomotility that goes in search of a solution.  Now, Play can be conceived as Locomotility for its own sake, i. e.  as enjoyment of the capacity of spontaneous motion.  Accordingly, Marcuse's concept of a "play-impulse", which, in his terminology, connotes an origin that precedes the Locomotility that constitutes Play, is an example of the suppression of Locomotility that is entailed in the concept of the Psyche that he inherits from Freud.

Psyche and Locomotility

The 'ground' of Kant's Groundwork can be recognized as the traditional tri-partite concept of the Psyche--"Nature" as the Vegetative, "Will" as the Locomotive, and "Reason" as the Calculative part.  His primary aim is to demonstrate that the third can liberate the second from the influence of the first.  Now, one criticism of his effort, e. g. Schopenhauer's, is that Calculation is always at bottom in the service of Vegetative processes, as Hume claims.  Another is implicit in Freud's concept of the Psyche--that Calculation is actually determined by social forces.  However, regardless of their merits, neither of them addresses the internal problem that eventually emerges, with which Kant wrestles unsuccessfully.  For, as he discovers, the possibility of liberating the Will, via Reason, from organic need, presupposes the inherent independence of Locomotility from both of the other two divisions of the Psyche.  He, thus, shares with his critics, and with most other theorists of the Psyche, a neglect, if not a suppression, of that independence, without which a study of human motivation would be empty.

Cathexis and Field

Freud's image of Cathexis as a 'charged' interest implies a possible extension that neither he nor Marcuse considers.  As is the case in Electromagnetism, a multiplicity of charged items can, when in proximity, constitute a Field, in which their behaviors are interdependent.  The classical concept of Eros, as well as that of its popular Cupid incarnation, as mutual attraction, can be conceived as such a Field.  However, even as he ventures from Psychoanalysis into Social theory, Freud lacks the resouces to study individual behavior as determined by such collectives, which, as populated by Egos, is not to be confused with his concept of a Group, i. e. a mob, which is constituted by Ids.  Likewise, by accepting Freud's Social Atomism, Marcuse is hindered from even entertaining a concept that could enrich his model of an ideal society.

Psyche and Cathexis

The implicit heart of Freud's theory of the Psyche is the experience that, in translation, is termed 'Cathexis', meaning 'charged interest'.  In the experience, the object of Cathexis is perceived as charged, a reflection of the influence of Brentano's Intentionality on Freud, i. e. in which the appearing-charged of the object of perception is for the perceiver.  It is this electric-like characteristic of sexual desire that distinguishes it from other impulses, thereby explaining Freud's privileging of Eros over other drives, a focus that could be itself characterized as cathectic.

Greed and Psyche

It seems difficult to deny that Greed is a significant factor in the de-humanization of workers under Capitalism. Now, according to Aristotle, Greed is not only a Moral vice, but a Psychological disorder, as well.  For, not only does it consist in taking more than one's share, it is constituted by a disruption of Psychic harmony--an Intemperance of one drive, that can be harmful to other vital functions, e. g. overeating that disrupts sleep.  Thus, the Psychoanalysis of Greed requires the recognition of a multiplicity of organic processes.  But, Marcuse, following Freud, recognizes only one Vital principle--Eros.  So, not only does he lack the conceptual resources to recognize, diagnose, and remedy one of the fundamental discontents of civilization, that Psychic reduction might itself be interpreted as an expression of Intemperance, i. e. of a Self-Indulgence, which is intemperate even if the product of a liberation from its opposite, Abstinence.