Morality, Imitating, Following

At #32 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes "following" an example from "imitating" one.  Later, at #47 and #49 he proposes that the former does not entail the implementation of a determinate rule, thereby implying that the latter does.  So, insofar as the adoption of his principle of Pure Practical Reason is interpreted, as it most prevalently is, as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as an instance of a determinate universal law, that adoption 'imitates' the principle.  In contrast, insofar as, as has been proposed here, it is interpreted as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as setting an example, that adoption 'follows' the principle.  Likewise, the formulation of a rival Moral principle, e. g. that of Utilitarianism, can be interpreted as, paradoxically, 'following' Kant's example.

Distributive Reason, Morality, Mimesis

Since imitation can be conceived as a type of adaptation, the emergence, in Darwinism, of Adaptation as a fundamental psychological principle suggests that Mimesis transcends its traditional Aristotelian restriction as an 'Aesthetic' topic.  Thus, for example, insofar as Representation is imitative of its object, Mimesis is an Epistemological topic, as well.  Likewise, insofar as, as is plain from earliest childhood behavior, imitation mediates interpersonal relations, it is not only a Moral topic, but, perhaps, the basis of all Morality.  But, imitation presupposes an exemplar.  Thus, Distributive Reason, i. e. the setting of an example, entails a recognition of the Moral significance of Mimesis.

Distributive Reason and the Principle of Pure Practical Reason

Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason is, to all known appearances, unprecedented, i. e. there is no evidence that it antedates him.  Thus, his formulation either makes explicit what is eternally implicit, culminates recent intellectual developments, or is simply an untimely product of genius--his own theory of History seems to suggest that he himself subscribes to the second hypothesis.  In any case, as a novel phenomenon, that he clearly projects as universally applicable, the principle is a product of example-setting Distributive Reason.

Distributive Reason, Totalizing Reason, Convention

The Platonization of the trial of Socrates transforms a critique of conventional interpretations of the concepts of 'impiety' and 'corrupting the youth', into a triumph of Soul over Body.  Likewise, Kant's pitting Totalizing Reason against individual inclination, finds common ground with conventional Deontology.  In contrast, Distributive Reason, which originates examples, is a potentially more effective vehicle of liberation from convention, and, thus, is closer to Socratic than to Platonist Reason.

Distributive Reason, Legislative Reason, Duty

Instead of reinforcing conventional Moral of Duty, by casting Rational Morality as structurally deontological, Kant might have taken the opportunity to present a critique of the former, i. e. by showing that the only duty worth acting upon for its own sake is rational duty.  To that end, instead of treating focusing on the subsumability of maxims under the formulations of Legislative Reason, he might have emphasized that maxims themselves are the source of laws.  For, as the basis of the creation of a law, a maxim is clearly independent of antecedent convention.  Thus, more generally, Distributive Reason, as the form of Examplification, more effectively liberates an individual from convention than does a Totalizing Reason, to the product of which one might have a 'duty' to submit.

Distributive Reason, Moral Copernican Revolution, Heliocentrism

Children imitate adults; adults serve as examples for children.  In other words, moral development entails a transition from Mimesis to Examplification.  So, as the expression "shining example" suggests, if there is a Moral 'Copernican revolution' to a heliocentric model of Rational conduct, it is to Distributive Reason, in which Reason sets examples, in the same way that the Sun distributes light throughout its system.  Accordingly, Autonomous Deontology, e. g. Kant's doctrine, constitutes an  incomplete stage of such a revolution.

Totalizing Reason and Distributive Reason

While Totalizing Reason unifies a multiplicity, Distributive Reason generates a multiplicity, for which the source is a universal entity.  Now, for Kant, Theoretical Reason is plainly Totalizing Reason.  However, in some respects--the Moral Law, qua first introduced by Kant; the universalization of a maxim; and the concept of a perfectly rational individual--his Practical Reason is, arguably, interpretable as Distributive Reason, while in others--the Kingdom of Ends, Soul, Deservedness, and God--it is Totalizing Reason.  Given that Totalization and Distribution are inverse processes, the admixture is potentially problematic for his Moral doctrine.  Specifically, their contrast with the productivity of Distributive Reason exposes those Totalizing elements of the doctrine as Theoretical, and not Practical, ideas.