Will, Matter, Extension

Wolfson proposes that Spinoza conceives the Extension-Thought relation as one of Matter-Form, with the innovation that Extension is as dynamic as is Thought. Now, while that interpretation explains how Extension and Thought can be two aspects of the same entity, it also gives rise to three further problems. First, it leaves unexplained how, as Spinoza contends, other Attributes are possible, i. e. how Matter and Form can admit of other complementary aspects. Second, the traditional notion of Form entails that of Formal Causality in relation to its corresponding Matter, thus entailing a violation of the non-interactionism of Spinoza's Extension-Form relation. Finally, neither Wolfson nor Spinoza elaborates on how Matter, traditionally conceived as inert, can be dynamic. In contrast, the 'Formaterial' system being developed here assumes Spinoza's insight, and attempts to resolve those problems. In general, the system conceives Matter-Form as Multiplicity-Unity, so, analogously, it defines, respectively, as a dynamic Material Principle, Becoming-Diverse, and a dynamic Formal Principle, Becoming-the-Same, with everything comprised of some combination of the two principles. Thus, for example, personal action combines Will and Comprehension, the Material and Formal Principles of personal experience. Accordingly, the system jettisons Spinoza's non-interactionism, as well as the possibility of additional equiprimordial Attributes, a thesis of little consequence anyhow in his system.

Will and Causal Chain

Spinoza's denial of 'free will' is based on his thesis that each idea in a Mode, adequate as well as inadequate, is part of some causal chain or other. However, like most traditional concepts of 'causal chain', his entails an unnoticed profound lacuna--the gap between an idea qua, first, effect of a preceding cause, and, then, qua cause of a subsequent effect. In other words, Spinoza accepts the traditional suppression of the distinction between two moments ascribed to one and the same element. In contrast, the distinction between the terminal moment of one episode, i. e. an effect, and the initiation of another, i. e. a cause, is here one of fundamental principle, i. e. that between the Formal and the Material Principles, respectively, of the system. In the context of personal experience, the Material Principle is Will, an origination of a novel episode that is irreducible to any of its conditioning antecedents. So, whatever the merits of Spinoza's arguments against 'free will' may be, they seem to be oblivious to this volitional dimension of behavior.

Will and Emotion

Sartre's theory of Emotion diverges from Spinoza's in one significant fundamental respect--whereas in the latter, an emotion is an undergone modification, in the former, it is a type of nascent action. In other words, for Sartre, an emotion is 'magical thinking', i. e. is a vicarious action in response to a situation, e. g. 'love' and 'hate' are vicarious attempts to preserve, or to eliminate, respectively, some influence. Here, even such vicarious exertion is a manifestation of Will. Accordingly, the effectiveness of Spinoza's program, which is based on the thesis that understanding an event as 'necessary' suffices to quell any emotion attached to it, is, on Sartre's analysis, due to the neutralization of vicarious action by depriving it of a specific target. Sartre's theory thus has the further advantage of being better equipped than Spinoza's to propose concrete alternative action as an effective corrective to an emotion, i. e. for Spinoza, the acquiescence arising from a moment of self-control does not suffice to generate a potentially reinforcing redirection of one's active powers. But, despite those differences, each doctrine implicitly rejects the kind of glorification of Emotion promoted by e. g. popular culture.

Will, Existence, Actuality

'Existence' seems equivocal for Spinoza, e. g. both an undrawn rectangle that is inscribed in a circle and a drawn one 'exist' in his system. Now, since each of those types of rectangle possesses extension, the latter cannot be the criterion of the distinction between the two. Instead, one way of characterization the difference is as 'virtual' vs. 'actual', given that Spinoza often uses the latter in reference to living Modes, to contrast them with their immortal essences, which are in God in the way a virtual rectangle is implicit in a circle. However, seemingly still lacking in Spinoza's system is an account of the process of actualization, e. g. 'causality' is insufficient, since it applies to virtual essences as well to actual things. In contrast, here, the nature of the process of actualization is clear from Spinoza's own genetic definition of a Circle--a combination of Will, i. e. indeterminate Motility, and structuring in accordance with the terms of the definition. Given Spinoza's recognition of virtual Extension, it is difficult to project into his system any analogously decisive notion of 'actualization'.

Will, Objectivity, Eternity

In some passages, Spinoza seems to suggest that the telos of the Ethics is the attainment of an intuition of God, but in others, that attainment is presented as implicated in the cultivation of adequate ideas, i. e. as a necessary means to the achievement of liberation from the influence of the Emotions. In that context, an adequate idea is analyzed as knowledge from a God's-eye view, that Spinoza characterizes as 'the aspect of eternity', a perspective that seems equivalent to the more contemporary classification 'objective', e. g. his analysis of the feeling of pleasure as an increase in strength. Now, as has been previously discussed here, the attainment of 'objectivity' entails a process of Externalization, e. g. an 'objective' perspective on oneself is one from the 'outside', a process that is effected by Will. Furthermore, self-objectification entails an hypostasization of the processes that are under observation, thereby eternalizing them. In contrast, Spinoza offers no explanation of what he means by 'eternity', especially as it pertains to a God which is presumably an indefinitely ongoing dynamic force.

Will and Acquiescence

As the reference in the proof of V, xxvii indicates, by 'acquiescence', Spinoza means personally pleasurable 'self-approval'. Hence, for him, the intuition of God that gives rise to acquiescence is not to be confused with a moment of Schopenhauerian self-denial. Still, the nature of the selfhood that such self-approval entails is unclear. For, the personal identity of a Mode, for Spinoza, is, ultimately, an a priori idea, and the specific object of the approval is a power of action, the source of which, in his system, are impersonal adequate ideas. So, in the absence of a principle such as Will, as defined here, to explain the personal a posteriori exertion involved in the cultivation of that power, any satisfaction that ensues remains seemingly unearned.

Will, Body, Essence

At III, vii, Spinoza defines 'essence' as a thing's "endeavor to persist in its own being", a definition which, in his note to II, ix, he indicates applies to Mind, and to the Mind-Body conjunction. Hence, he implies that the definition does not apply to Body, i. e. he implies that the essence of Body is not its endeavor to persist in its own being. Instead, at V, xxii, he suggests that the essence of Body is, more precisely, the essence of "this or that body", which implies that the essence of Body consists in its individuality. That implication is reinforced by his general thesis that Modes are distinguished by corporeal differences, i. e. that adequate ideas are common to different modes, while inadequate ones are contingent on physical differences. However, he stops short of explicitly defining the 'essence of this or that Body' as a 'principle of Individuation', a principle which, as has been previously discussed here, entails Will, the principle of Differentiation in personal experience. On that definition, personal identity is a product of self-cultivation, not an eternal essence that both precedes and survives the existence of its associated body, as it is for Spinoza, in apparent contradiction to his Thought-Extension Parallelism.