Singular, Individual, Part

The concept of a Singularity entails essential independence of one Singularity from another.  The concept of Individuality entails a commonality of type between Individuals, but independence otherwise.  As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's concept of a Mode is Individualistic, a deliberate critique of the concept of a Person as a Singularity, common to both some Theologies and naive experience.  A third possibility, of which Spinoza's Mode is itself an inadequate concept, is the Part, which entails an essential coordination between Parts.  Spinoza does not seem to recognize that two Modes are actually Parts when engaged in procreative activity.  The prominent example in Philosophy of a person conceived as a Part is Plato's Republic, which is a Polis that is organized on the basis of natural ability and natural need, which are equivalent in that model.  The closest modern example of a person as a Part is entailed in Smith's concept of Division of Labor, usually overshadowed by his concept of a person of a person as a profit-seeking Singularity.  But that example, in contrast with Plato's, is a contrivance, rather than natural.  However, the modern concept of a person as naturally a Part is entailed in, but pervasively unrecognized as such, any concept of Humankind as governed by some principle of History, i. e. which entails that each plays some role in the unfolding pattern.  Furthermore, the emergence of the concept of a Species as the fundamental subject of History, i. e. in Darwinism, specifies that the concept of a Whole that is the correlate of the concept of a Part, is, more precisely, that of an Organism.  Nevertheless, despite the widespread at least nominal acceptance of Darwinism, the predominant concept of a person remains the Singularity, though the persistence of that predominance may be challenged as the globalization of human society continues in the coming centuries.