Rationalism and Method

Unlike either Descartes or Locke, Spinoza sharply distinguishes Method from Epistemology.  On the one hand, his privileging of Intuition over Reason signifies that he is not an Epistemological Rationalist.  But, on the other, he is an exemplary Rationalist in his deductive Method of developing his doctrine.  Notable in that regard is that the fundamental entity in his doctrine is initially neither 'God' nor 'Nature', but 'Substance', one of Aristotle's Categories.  Indeed, the former two are extrinsic to the doctrine, as is, therefore, the classification of it as 'Pantheistic'.  But, this Methodological Rationalism does not preclude Intuition; rather, immediate cognition is implicitly required for the positing of an Axiom, and of Substance as such.  Thus, what appears in the exposition as a deduced 'Knowledge of God', must signify a reconstruction of the moment that grounds the entire doctrine--a dynamic Intuition of Substance.  Thus, the classification of the doctrine as either Theological or Physicist, i. e. on the basis of characterizing Substance as 'God' and/or 'Nature', is, in Rational terms, accidental.