Reflective Judgment and Communication

According to Kant, Reflective Judgment is the source of any imputation of Purpose to a phenomenon, i. e. a Purpose cannot be empirically discerned, but might, nonetheless, have value if so imputed, e. g. in linking the functions of different parts of a living body.  But in one case, this faculty has more than mere value; for, according to Kant's doctrine--it is necessary.  This is the case in when fortunate circumstances can be interpreted as a 'divine reward for Virtue', the possibility of which is required by Pure Practical Reason, and, thus, also required is there being a cognitive capacity for recognizing it as such.  So, Reflective Judgment is that capacity.  He also applies Reflective Judgment to explain how judgments of Aesthetic Taste can be Subjective, yet universally valid, which, while interesting, seems extrinsic to the primary systematic problem of grounding the interpretation of an event as divinely caused.  However, he misses its potential relevance to a more germane issue that emerges in the process of his development of the concept of Taste.  That issue is entailed in the concept of "communicability", that he analyzes as an element in such judgments.  For, the concept of communicability entails the concept of Communication, one dimension of which, i. e. that one is the addressee of a communication, is the imputation of Purpose to words spoken, being looked out, etc.  Now, focusing on the plain routine fact of interpersonal communication exposes Kant's concept of divine communication, that is entailed in his concept of a divine reward, as derived not from Pure Reason, but from ordinary empirical experience.  It also exposes, as Buber and Levinas tackle more than a century later, the moral questionability of ascribing to an esoteric faculty such as Reflective Judgment the mediation of interpersonal relations, e. g. a mother's awareness of a crying baby.  Furthermore, Kant leaves unexamined the entailment of a concept of Communication in the cardinal moment of his doctrine--the "you" of his Categorical Imperative.  Instead, as Buber and Levinas imply, the elimination of Purpose from Cognition, which Spinoza develops and Kant accepts, entails the treatment of a person as a 'thing', i. e. the words of whom can only be 'effects', and, hence, as Morally forbidden.  Perhaps it is because his attention to Aesthetic Reflective Judgment is only a late development in the elaboration of his architechtonic, that Kant does not recognize that he has a response to Spinoza's doctrine that is potentially more powerful than the one that he does present.  However, such recognition could also lead him to jettison the premises of his own doctrine that he shares with Spinoza, e. g. that Purpose is not be found in the Natural world.