Reason and Hope

Spinoza's Rational concept of an Emotion is very different from the popular one, which is Sentimentalist, according to which an Emotion is an irreducible Sense-Datum, distinguished from other Emotions as a color might be distinguished from other colors, and evaluated as such.  In contrast, he conceives an Emotion to be either simple or compound, with the two simple Emotions Pleasure and Pain.  But those two are not irreducible data; rather they are each representations of an increase or decrease in strength, and evaluated on the basis of the criterion that an increase in strength is Good, and a decrease is Bad.  One notable, and historically significant, example of Spinoza's version is Hope, which he analyzes as entailing Fear, and, hence, as constituted by an admixture of Pleasure and Pain.  Accordingly, the value of Hope is much lower in his doctrine than its common often exalted status in other doctrines.  Hence, Hope is not an Emotion that Reason promotes.  Thus, according to Spinoza's Rational Ethics, Kant's question, 'If I do as I ought, what can I hope for?' is not a question that Reason would pose.  Likewise, Kant's answer--Happiness in accordance with Virtue--is not an answer that Reason would give, nor, therefore, is such Happiness part of a Rational Highest Good.  Thus, the concepts of Religion and Deity that Kant bases on the latter are not Rational, which in conjunction with Kant's own refutations of traditional proofs of the existence of that deity, completes the severance of Reason from Medieval Theology.  Now, Kant's rejoinder to Spinoza--that such Happiness is greater than that which inherently accompanies Virtue--even if true, is a posteriori, and, hence, inadequate to what is an a priori analysis.  Its shortcoming begins with a failure to address the basis of this Spinozist challenge--that according to Rational Ethics, Hope is deficient--a problem that will likely continue to be ignored in contemporary popular culture.