Rationalism and Vitalism

The standard classification of Spinoza as a Rationalist, in a continuum with Descartes and Leibniz, is accurate insofar as he conceives Thought to be superior to Sense, and because there is in their works an explicit overlap of common topics.  However, the classification is misleading, for three main reasons: 1. His concept of Reason, unlike those of the other two, is fundamentally Practical; 2. He recognizes a cognitive faculty superior to Reason--Intuition; and 3. The fundamental principle of his doctrine is more accurately classified as Vitalist, aligning him with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson, of whom he can be recognized as a forerunner.  That #3 is easily overlooked is understandable, given that Spinoza only briefly alludes to it explicitly in the Ethics, in a mere note that he adds to Proposition 29 of Book 1, of Part 1.  But that principle, 'Naturing Nature', which he contrasts with 'Natured Nature', is systematically prior to the traditional Dualisms that he explicitly treats--God-Nature, Mind-Body, and Thought-Extension.  Instead, that pair is the forerunner of Schopenhauer's Will-Representation, Nietzsche's Dionysian-Apollonian, and Bergson's Elan Vital-Matter contrasts, a kinship that Nietzsche likely recognizes.  But that kinship does not hang on an obscure passage--it is more plainly evident in the concept of an immanent deity that they share, and which Spinoza's presumed fellow Rationalists do not.