Reliability and Truth

A 'true' friend is a 'reliable' friend.  Likewise, a 'true' utterance can easily be defined as one which reliably serves to accomplice a purpose.  In contrast, the latter meaning is difficult to derive from the Logicist meaning of 'true'.  But, the bigger problem for that orientation is the formulation of any definition of 'true'.  For, the primary aim of Logicism is to distinguish appropriate concatenations of symbols from inappropriate ones, i. e. to define 'Validity', with respect to which not only the determination of the correct application of that criterion, but the very concept of the application of it, is extrinsic.  In other words, a concept of Truth can be derived from that of Reliability, but not conversely.  That conclusion likely aggravates Logicists, but it is a consequence of the insularity of their own program.