Meaning, Stipulation, Neologism

Practitioners of contemporary Philosophy of Logic Semantics tend to characterize 'Meaning', e. g. 'Sense' or 'Reference', as a  property a-temporally possessed by a linguistic unit, possibly on the model of some concept of Mathematical terms.  However, if they were to examine a procedure with which most of them are likely familiar, one which is the origin of Frege's categories themselves, they might reconsider that characterization.  That procedure is Stipulation, i. e. that by which they themselves produce many definitions, e. g. that by which Frege first fixes his uses of 'Sense' and 'Reference'.  Now, a Stipulation confers Meaning on a term by formulating conditions for its proper use.  In other words, a Stipulative Definition is a Proposal, the efficacy of which is dependent on a continued accepting response to it.  Furthermore, Naming, which some distinguish from Defining, is likewise stipulative, i. e. the 'necessity' that some attribute to a Name is contingent on the Name gaining consensual adoption following its introduction.  So, if these theorists were to examine their own operations, they might discover how contrived their resultant theories are.  In other words, an examination of a construction of a Meta-language reveals that the underlying structure of Language is neither that of Proposition Logic nor of Modal Logic, but, is, rather, Neologistic.