Lying and Philosophy

The previously proposed characterization of Lying as 'sending mixed signals', presupposes, like Kant's example of False Promising, the discovery of the falsehood.  In any case, Kant's silence, in the course of that presentation, on the topic of Lying, of which False Promising is a special case, is a reminder that there has been no systematic Philosophical attention to the topic since Plato.  Now, the treatment of it in The Republic can characterized as 'sending mixed signals'.  For, on the one hand, he asserts, at 3.389b, that "the rulers of the city may . . . lie . . . for the benefit of the state", which, according to 3.414b, is a "noble lie".  However, on the other, in his later discussion of Philosophy, which he esteems as the "noblest pursuit" (6.489a), the Philosopher is one who will "hate" (6.490a) Lying.  Furthermore, in neither discussion is there attention to the variable of a lie being discovered, in sharp contrast to his Ring of Gyges example of  2.359d.  So, in the closest approximation to a systematic examination of the topic, there is no definitive moral judgment of Lying, let alone any univocal definition of it.