Nonsense and Equivocation

Upon closer examination, the example that serves Deleuze, in the Logic of Sense, as his prototype of 'nonsensical' language is, in fact, merely equivocal.  That example is from the Parmenides, not from Lewis Carroll, so a serious analysis of it is not inappropriate.  There, according to Plato's 'Parmenides', and likely historically accurate, someone can simultaneously become older and younger, because, while one is aging, the one that one was is becoming less old than the one that one now is, a scenario that Deleuze believes Carroll represents analogously in the case of Alice growing simultaneously larger and smaller.  However, Parmenides' exposition is merely equivocal--the older 'self' and the younger 'self' are distinct entities, as the applicability of the underlying symmetrical principle 'A > B = B < A' entails.  So, regardless of Carroll's intentions while playing with ambiguity, Delueuze's primary ambition--to demonstrate that Nonsense is an inherent positive property of Language, i. e. is not merely an original lack--fails.  Nor does invoking Meinong here, as he occasionally does elsewhere in the book, salvage the project, for, to argue that some Lekta, e. g. that of 'X is becoming both older and younger', are contradictory, does not suffice to prove that all Lekta are so, and, hence that all Language is fundamentally nonsensical.