Will, Virtue, Pleasure

Kant ascribes to Spinoza the following argument: 1. Pleasure is the consciousness of Virtue; 2. The degree of pleasure involved in the consciousness of Virtue is greater than any involved in the satisfaction of some need; 3. Therefore, Virtue suffices without Happiness, i. e. without the satisfaction of needs. Kant challenges the conclusion by denying #2, i. e. by observing that the pleasure of self-control does not suffice to offset circumstantial miseries. However, #1 is erroneous ascribed to Spinoza. For, the latter's concept of Pleasure is that it is identical to Virtue, i. e. he innovatively conceives it to be itself an energizing process, rendered here as Will, and is not an extrinsic receptive representation of one, as Kant construes the concept to be. It follows from that concept that the greatest Virtue and the greatest Happiness are identical, not that Virtue suffices without Happiness, e. g. that virtuous eating, i. e. eating according to a regimen, is more pleasurable than compulsive eating, not that self-controlled hunger is more pleasurable that yielding to some tempting aroma. In other words, Spinoza is a non-teleological Eudaemonist proposing an a priori defintion of Pleasure, and not, as Kant takes him to be, a Stoic offering an a posteriori utilitarian evaluation of Virtue.