Will, Democracy, Friendship

The Straussian interpretation of modern political theory as a morally degenerate version of its ancient counterpart, i. e. the subordination of Good to Right, misses a more fundamental development. For, Spinoza's concept of Democracy pioneers an extension of the ancient concept of Reason, an extension that becomes more fully formulated in Kant's system. The central thesis of modernized Reason is the equivalence of distinct 'I's which Aristotle classifies as 'friendship', but not necessarily as 'rational', a category which, following Plato, is exclusively intra-psychic in his system. In other words, Spinoza's concept of Democracy is a universalization of the Aristotelian good Friendship, a derivation which is, therefore, independent of any concept of Right. Here, whether localized or universal, the recognition of a distinct I as another 'self' entails the recognition of another entity as alterior to oneself, a process which is effected by Will, the principle of Externalization in personal experience. On the basis of that model, the Straussian critique of modern Democracy is that its universal Equality trivializes Friendship, one response to which is that that critique expresses a small-mindedness that is unequal to the ardors of modern Morality.