Will and Self-Determination

Spinoza's denial of the existence of 'free will' often gets him classified as a 'determinist'. However, a more precise rubric comes from a notion often associated with contemporary political theory--'self-determination'--because Spinoza believes that all behavior has a prior cause, in some cases internal, in others external. Furthermore, as a word that is relatively fresh to the traditional 'free will vs. determinism' debate, 'self-determination' helps reveal how that opposition is typically misbegotten. For, 'self-determination' more clearly connotes a transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, and, with 'term' literally meaning 'limit', not 'choice', a transition from formlessness to formed, not from undecided to decided, as it commonly is taken to be. Now, while traditionally, inert 'matter' has been taken as the recipient of 'form', here, Matter, as has been discussed, is construed dynamically, e. g. in personal experience, Will is the recipient of Form. Hence, 'self-determination' is the process of supplying oneself with a structure for the exercise of one's energies, and, more, generally, Will and Determination are not antagonistic alternatives, but are complementary principles of action. Spinoza's focus on Efficient Causality, to the neglect of both Formal and Material, perhaps prevent him from arriving at a similar conclusion.