Will, Freedom, Negation

As previously discussed, Kant erroneously interprets Spinoza's concept of Pleasure--a liberating process--as an extrinsic consciousness of that process. He compounds the error by interpreting Spinoza's concept of Freedom--the transformation of passive behavior into active behavior--as a mere constraint upon passive behavior., thereby facilitating his utilitarian calculation of presumed 'freedom' as relatively meager. Underlying the second error is his interpretation of that Freedom as Negation, without the further recognition that Negation is an abstraction from Differentiation. That recognition is expressed here by the concept of Will as the principle of Diversification in personal experience, i. e. a re-direction of behavior, not a cessation of it. Accordingly, Kant cannot appreciate that Freedom for Spinoza is exemplified not by the resistance to a tempting aroma, but by replacing compulsive eating with a dietary regimen. That short-sightedness also shapes Kant's own efforts to derive positive duties from a formula that is fundamentally a prohibitive principle.