Will, Right, Might

Spinoza advocates the thesis that 'Might is Right'. For, he holds that natural right is co-extensive with natural power, i. e. with the endeavor to persist in one's being, in general, and with the exercise of one's talents, in particular. However, his unabashed application of that principle to violent or foolish behavior seems ungrounded. For, on his analysis, such behavior entails, at least in part, inadequate ideas, and, hence, it is, at least in part, heteronomous, i. e. it entails external influences such as compulsion, social conditioning, etc. Thus, violent or foolish behavior is not entirely a product of one's own powers, and, therefore, is not co-extensive with natural right. In contrast, here, the irreducibly personal element of any behavior is Will, the principle of exertion that activates any endeavor to persist, in general, and any exercise of talent, in particular. On that model, degree of volition in behavior is a function of the expansiveness of the ideas that impart determinacy to Will, on the basis of which violent or foolish behavior is exposed as typically compulsive, i. e. as typically with little scope for deliberation. Hence, it is not that Might is not Right, but that on Spinoza's own definition of 'adequacy', behavior constrained by external influences is not truly personal Might.