Deservedness, General Will, Monarchy

Kant's argument that Reason requires a synthesis of Virtue and Happiness does not suffice to establish that that synthesis is constituted by a relation of Deservedness.  One possible independent proof of the latter is based on the relation of proportionality entailed by Deservedness--insofar as Proportionality is equivalent to Ratio, with the latter, arguably, a mode of Reason, Deservedness is a rational concept.  Now, proportionality presupposes the commensurability of its terms, and the only indication of the commensurability of Virtue and Happiness in Kant's exposition is that the former entails self-constraint, and, hence, a sacrifice of happiness.  It follows that Deservedness for Kant is compensation, as the Utilitarians suspect.  Now, insofar as Reason requires the possibility of divine intervention to effect such compensation, the arc of Kant's exposition of Practical Reason, from the Groundwork, to the 2nd Critique, to Religion, constitutes a critique of Rousseau's concept of Democracy.  For, Kantian Practical Reason begins as a representation of Rousseau's General Will, which is the basis of the latter's concept of Democracy.  So, if a Kingdom, with a deity as its monarch, emerges as the ideal collectivity according to that Reason,, Kant's exposition serves to demonstrate that a such a Monarchy serves as a corrective to the flaws of that Democracy.

Reason, Deservedness, Action

In Kant's system, 'Virtue' and 'Justice' are distinguished in terms of 'inner' and 'outer'.  Now, 'worthiness' is a kind of  'justice'.  Thus, his contention that "virtue is the worthiness to be happy" does not, in itself, accomplish the totalization of the Good, which is why a mediating 'God' is necessary for the synthesis.  However, in his system, there is a more fundamental chasm between inner and outer--that between intention and action.  So, if there is anything that Virtue fundamentally deserves, it is its outer efficacy.  Similarly, the primary function of a 'God' that is conceived within the limits of reason would be to actualize Reason.

Morality, God, and The Limits of Reason

If Reason had a Deity, it would be the ancient Logos, not to be confused with the Christianized variation.  If it were the basis of a Moral doctrine, 'good' would be either rational processes, or whatever promotes rational processes.  Likewise, 'evil' would be either irrational processes, or whatever promotes irrational processes, including whatever is detrimental to rational processes.  Now, since the satisfaction of need can breed complacency, individual happiness is not necessarily a rational 'good'.  Hence, even as a reward for rational conduct, happiness is not necessarily a 'good'.  Therefore, Kant's concept of Deservedness, which combines rational conduct with happiness as its reward, as well as what he derives from it--the existence of 'God', and an appropriate Religion--are, from the outset, outside the limits of Reason.

Reason and Freedom of Choice

One of Kant's controversial theses is that humans possess a freedom by which they can wittingly disobey Reason, a thesis which, consequently, grounds the existence of 'Evil' in such 'freedom of choice'.  He, thus, opposes Aristotle and Spinoza, who contend that malfeasance always entails an intellectual error of some kind.  The closest that Kant approaches to a proof of the existence of that faculty begins with the proposition that Deservedness is a Rational concept, so that the capacity, entailed by that concept, to choose Vice as well as Virtue, is, likewise, a Rational concept.  However, that proof betrays itself.  For, the presumed Rationality of Deservedness presupposes that of individual Happiness, one of its components.  But, explicitly and implicitly, in its formulation, the principle of Pure Practical Reason is indifferent, at best, to any concept of Happiness.  Hence, the ascription of a concept of 'freedom of choice' to Reason constitutes an intellectual error.  Furthermore, that the concept of Deservedness grounds his subsequent proof of the 'existence of God', encourages the diagnosis that Kant's thesis of the existence of a 'freedom of choice' is the product of a vestigial irrational Theological prejudice.

Force, General Will, Pure Practical Reason

Kant's concept of Pure Practical Reason is inspired by Rousseau's notion of a 'general will', and his concept of Autonomy potentially clarifies one of the apparent difficulties entailed in the latter, i. e. how the expression of collective interest does not suppress the interests of the individuals who comprise that collective.  He could, for example, follow Spinoza, and analyze Autonomy,say, as the mutual enhancement of forces inhering in differing locations.  However, by admitting a supernatural entity into the collective, as its ruler, Kant not only converts a Democracy into Kingdom, if not into a Theocracy, but transforms his initial concept of Autonomy.  For, what begins as a struggle of Reason against external influences gets re-configured, by the introduction into scheme of a power to choose between the participants in that struggle, a power which, as independent of them, can have only a supernatural origin..  Accordingly, what begins as Rousseau's innovative concept of political self-rule, ends, in Kant's oeuvre, i. e. in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as a traditional theological 'problem of Evil'.  Kant, thus, squanders an opportunity to join Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza, in grounding Political Philosophy in Reason.

Attraction, Repulsion, Social Antagonism

Three basic occasions of sub-atomic Repulsion are: the Proton, which, in itself, is a repulsive force; the interaction of two Protons, i. e. of two repulsive forces; and the interaction of two Electrons, i. e. of two attractive forces exerted in opposing directions.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the Rational resistance to Sympathy entails the latter interaction.  Hence, it is not to be confused with the social antagonism that is constituted by two repulsive forces, e. g. the struggle between entrepreneurs and laborers for the profits that some product has generated.

Reason, Sympathy, Depersonalization

Kant's emphasis on the deontological aspects of his doctrine--universalization, duty for duty's sake, a categorical imperative, etc.--tends to reinforce the popular reputation, based on the self-evident privacy of feelings, of Reason as a depersonalizing faculty.  In contrast, the representation of Reason and Sympathy as forces illustrates, to the contrary, that it is Sympathy that depersonalizes, while it is Reason that empowers, the individual.  For, as has been previously argued here, Sympathy is a trans-personal attractive force, which Reason, as an intrapersonal attractive force, can counter.  Furthermore, the apparently impersonal universalization effected by Reason has been shown to actually be the product of an intrapersonal repulsive force.  In other words, the source of Reason is within the individual, while that of Sympathy is external to it, on this representation of them.  Now, Kant attempts to make the same point regarding that distinction with his Autonomy-Heteronomy contrast.  However, the vestigial supernaturalism of his doctrine, which entails that Reason is a mysterious visitation, only undercuts that effort, thereby reinforcing the popular reputation.

Attraction, Sympathy, Reason

The contemporary emphasis on Epistemology has obscured how for Kant 'Rationalism' is not only a Cognitive orientation, in contrast with 'Empiricism', but a Moral one, as well, in contrast with 'Sentimentalism'.  Now, Sympathy, the fundamental principle of the predominant Sentimentalist doctrine of the era, i. e. Hume's, as unifying different people, is, plainly, an attractive force.  So, insofar as Kant rejects the suitability of Sympathy as a foundation of Morality, because it entails the possibility of ignoble behavior as occasioning compassion, e. g. when a criminal commiserates with an arrested associate, he conceives his Rational principle as capable of resisting the pull of a sympathetic feeling.  But, such resistance is effected by an attractive force in the opposite direction, i. e. inwardly.  In other words, for Kant, Reason can function as an attractive dynamic natural force.

Heliocentrism, Morality, Repulsion

As has been previously argued here, the Copernican thesis that Kant conceives as analogous to his Epistemological inversion is that of the Earth spinning on its axis, not that of the Earth orbiting the Sun, as the standard interpretation has it.  However, that argument does not preclude completely the influence of the Heliocentric image on Kant's doctrine, just that it is not part of any 'revolution'.  For, Heliocentrism prevails in ancient Philosophy, not as an Astronomical thesis, but as a metaphor for Morality, i. e. the Sun is the image of the 'Good' for Plato--immobile, like all Platonic Forms, with respect to which any behavior that it can effect is transient.  Likewise, Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason is the fixed source of virtuous conduct.  So, the Heliocentric influence on Kant's Moral doctrine is directly inherited, not mediated by a Copernican inversion.  Now, the emanatory power of the Sun can be classified in Kant's system as a 'repulsive' force.  Hence, his Practical Reason can likewise be conceived as a repulsive force.

Reason, Universalization, Repulsion

On the standard interpretation of Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason, the one that he very likely intends, the specific function of Reason is to effect the universalization of a maxim, from which a compelling of respect eventuates.  In other words, the 'causality' that that reading ascribes to Reason is one that mysteriously inheres in its role as a supernatural faculty, i. e. as the source of universal representations.  In contrast, the universalization of a maxim can also be conceived as a process of what is here called 'Examplification', i. e. of setting an example, in which one wittingly projects oneself towards others.  In other words, the causality that the alternative interpretation ascribes to Reason is a palpable one, that consists in its functioning as a dynamic repulsive force, i. e. as generating outward projection.  So, absent, as has been previously discussed here, his commitment to theological supernaturalism, Kant might have fully embraced the concept of a more palpable natural Reason, and, hence, the classification of it as a dynamic force.

Examplification and Repulsion

Previously here, 'Examplification', i. e. actively 'setting an example', was introduced as a contrast to 'exemplification', i. e. passively 'being an example'.  Now, setting an example is an efferentially radiatory motion, and efferentially radiatory motion is, in Kant's system, characteristic of Repulsion.  Thus, Examplification can be classified as a 'repulsive' dynamic force.

Reason, Attraction, Repulsion

Absent the premise that Reason--i. e. Pure Practical Reason, its fundamental mode, according to Kant--is a supernatural faculty which he maintains on perhaps only theological grounds, as has been previously discussed, it can be re-conceived in his system as a 'dynamic force'.  As such, functioning as a constraint on impulses, it can be classified as an 'attractive' force.  Or, alternatively, functioning as resistance to external stimuli, it can be classified as a 'repulsive' force.  So, there is at least prima facie evidence that Reason, like any other existent, is constituted by Attraction and Repulsion.

Reason, Faculty, Force

Kant's subordination of Practical Reason to Theoretical Reason entails that of Agency to Subjectivity, and, hence, that of the concept of Reason as dynamic force, to that of it as transcendental faculty.  But, a dynamical force is, in his system, a 'natural' force.  Thus, his concept of Deity as rational, supernatural, and efficacious, is problematic.  Accordingly, the absence of a full development of a concept of Agency, one in which, e. g., Space is a Form of Action, not of Intuition, perhaps reflects Kant's theological commitments.

Repulsion and Solidity

The thesis that all Matter is a product of Attraction and Repulsion is difficult to reconcile with the ordinary experience of 'solid' objects.  However, that the 'subject' of experience is actually an agent, i. e. is itself constituted by repulsive and attractive forces, transforms 'solidity' into another repulsive force, i. e. to a resistance to the repulsion of an agent.  In other words, 'solidity' is what Kant calls an 'appearance', i. e. it has no subsistence independent of the context of the interaction of two repulsive forces, even if Kant's failure to completely re-conceive Subjectivity as Agency prevents him from similarly re-conceiving Appearance as the product of Dynamic interaction.  Likewise, if Locke had conceived his subject of experience not as a passive slate, but as constituted by dynamic Primary Qualities, he might have arrived at a concept of Secondary Qualities as resulting from the interaction of subjective and objective Primary Qualities.

Electricity, Repulsion, Attraction

Electricity is generally conceived as constituted by two types of 'charged' particle--one 'positively' charged, i. e. the Proton, the other, 'negatively' charged, i. e. the Electron.  In turn, 'charge' is typically characterized in mechanical, i. e. external, terms--oppositely charged particles attract, like charged particles repel, and charge is represented in terms of meters and kilograms.  Furthermore, the 'particle' to which charge is attributed is, likewise, characterized in mechanical terms, i. e. as possessing 'Mass', which is defined in terms of Acceleration.  However, underlying these mechanical characteristics are dynamical, i. e. internal, processes--the Proton is repulsive, and the Electron is attractive, which, with 'particle' being no more than a mechanical construct, are, therefore, nothing more than forces.  In other words, Electricity is nothing more than a specific combination of Repulsion and Attraction.

Fundamental Particles and Electrical Charge

As Physicists continue to seek fundamental particles, they may have already discovered a fundamental notion.  The erstwhile 'fundamental' particle, the atom, has, in recent centuries, been determined as constituted by protons, electrons, and neutrons, each of which is characterized as possessing as type of 'electrical charge', i. e. 'positive' or 'negative'.  A neutron, too, is constituted by a combination of positive and negative charge, for it possesses a net charge of zero, which is not to be confused with being charge-less.  Furthermore, the constituents of these particles, e. g. quarks, all possess charge.  So, while the subdivision of particles continues, the nature of 'electrical charge' seems to remain unanalyzed.

Chenistry and Dynamics

The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science precedes the systematization of Chemistry, pioneered by Lavoisier, so Kant's concept of Chemistry as a mere "art", despite his occasional references to it to illustrate his own theory, is justified at the time.  But, not only could he not have anticipated the ascendancy since of Chemistry as a science independent of Physics, he could not have appreciated his own prescience.  That is, insofar as the fundamental elements of modern Chemistry are entities constituted as, and distinguishable by, specific combinations of attractive and repulsive forces at one location, that science exemplifies Kant's theory of Dynamics.

Peripatetic and Sedentary

Because of his conducting classes while walking about, Aristotle has been dubbed the 'Peripatetic'.  In contrast, a doctrine that is substantively 'Peripatetic' might begin with walking about as a paradigmatic experiential scenario.  Now, perambulation entails two main primary components--Motility and Proprioception, i. e. motor processes, and the regulation of them.  Arguably, Aristotle's Good--activity governed by the 'Golden Mean'--is conceivable as 'Peripatetic' in that sense, i. e. as a special case of the exercise of motor processes under the guidance of a homeostatic principle.  However, in Aristotle's doctrine, that Good is outranked by Contemplation, which abstracts from Motility.  So, Aristotelianism  is more 'Sedentary' than 'Peripatetic'.  Likewise, the peak experience in Heidegger's system, the revelation of Being, is independent of the perambulatory scenario of some of his works.

Subjectivity and Agency

The second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is often interpreted as either a tweaking of, or a shifting of emphasis in, the system presented in the first.  However, there are also indications of a more radical variation, verging on an entirely different doctrine.  Between the two editions, Kant produces both a theory of Practical Reason, and one of Natural Science, each of which studies an entity which is dynamic.  Thus, his repeated interest, articulated exclusively in the second edition, in examples of the self-cognition of a corporeally active subject, may be more than coincidental, i. e. may reflect the results of his more recent research.  Those examples illustrate the concept of a Subject of Experience that is not merely one to which objects conform, but, one which is, furthermore, in motion, thereby suggesting an analogous variation on the standard interpretation of the 'Copernican revolution', as has been previously discussed here.  So, what is nascent, even if not fully developed, in the second edition, is a concept of dynamic Subjectivity, i. e. of Agency, that is in contrast with not only that of the static Subjectivity of the first edition, but with the privileged status of the detached observed that dominates Philosophy both before and after the Critique of Pure Reason.  Now, Agency entails an irreducible motile factor, with which any cognitive factor, beginning with Proprioception, is fundamentally coordinated, a coordination that, therefore, conditions any theory of Consciousness, and of Knowledge.  So, even if Kant verges on a concept of Agency, his adherence to a concept of Space that is suited to passive observation, not to motility, shows that his concept of Subjectivity, as innovative as it is, ultimately remains rooted in tradition.

Proprioception and Attraction

As a homeostatic process, Proprioception centers the Motility of an organism.  Thus, it can be conceived as an attractive force counteracting a repulsive force.  In other words, the human organism can be classified in Kant's system as a body constituted by fundamental dynamic forces.  So, just as such a body is so constituted independent of whether or not it remains at one location, a human organism combines Proprioception and Motility whether or not it is walking, lying down, or sitting in a chair doubting that it is corporeal.

Proprioception and Homeostasis

As an awareness of motor processes, Proprioception is best examined in the context of motile activity.  Therein, under normal circumstances, like one's clothing, it is absorbed into the background of activity, becoming discernible only in the event of a disruption.  Thus, the primary function of Proprioception is revealed on the occasion of e. g. stumbling while walking--as homeostatic, i. e. as restoring physiological balance.  In other words, it is like the preferred setting on a thermostat--a normative ideal that becomes a descriptive representation only upon satisfaction.  Thus, since that satisfaction has usually been achieved with the body in an immobile position, the Proprioceptive process is easily overlooked by the philosophical tradition in which the sedentary observer is the paradigmatic subject.

Proprioception, Kinaesthesia, Detachment

In theories of Consciousness such as Leibniz' and Phenomenalism, there are seeming proprioceptive elements, i. e. apparently internal data that are construed as independent of any external entity.  However, the contemporary concept of Proprioception exhibits what distinguishes it from such other theories that also accommodate a mode of inner sensibility--its kinaesthesia.  That is, the immediate objects of Proprioception are motor processes, from which corporeality is difficult to abstract.  So, the lack of recognition in even those theories may be due less to analytical omission, than to the their commitment to the paradigm of a detached subject that is entrenched in modern Philosophy, i. e. a paradigm that is not easily reconcilable with the concept of either a motile subject, or an embodied one.

Proprioception and Outer Perception

Closing one's eyes helps reveal Proprioception as a substratum of all Experience.  Re-opening them shows how easily Outer Perception can conceal that dimension.  Alternatively, retaining the perspective of  the substratum while re-opening one's eyes, shows how Vision can be incorporated into Proprioception, such that a presumed 'outer' object, e. g. a color, can be construed as an inner datum.  However, rather than confirming, for example, a Lockeian theory of Secondary Qualities, the alternative, more conclusively, demonstrates that all Experience is constituted by the compresence of  Proprioception and Outer Perception, to varying degrees of relative emphasis, with the suppression of the former by the latter the most common combination.

Proprioception and Sedentary Observation

Descartes' segue from sedentary observer to disembodied consciousness might be less seamless if he took into account the prequel to this prototypical philosophical scenario--e. g. his walking into the room, and lowering himself into the chair.  For, he might then not as easily abstract from Proprioception, of which the awareness of one as seated is a special case, in the process.  Accordingly, insofar as his procedure helps establish the 'detached' observer as the paradigmatic subject of modern Philosophy, that tradition suppresses Proprioception from its outset.

Proprioception and Soul

Proprioception is often experienced as an awareness of an 'I' existing within one's body.  This experience is often interpreted as revealing the existence of a 'ghost within the machine', i. e. of the existence of an entity that is independent of the body.  Accordingly, it has often been adduced as evidence of the existence of an incorporeal substance, typically termed 'Soul', and, in some cases, as sufficient proof of the latter, i. e. that the existence of Soul is the exclusive adequate explanation of that experience.  So, insofar as Proprioception is constituted as an empirical cognition, i. e. as a cognition of physiological processes, it, at minimum, provides an alternative, explanation of the 'ghost in the machine', and, at maximum, disproves dualistic doctrines that are based on the stronger interpretation of the significance of that image.  Given that Proprioception, verified by contemporary Neuro-Psychology, continues to go generally unrecognized by Philosophical systems, both challenges to Dualism remain unmet.

Physics and Metaphysics

Kant seems to conceive 'physical' as synonymous with 'material'.  If so, then Attraction and Repulsion are 'physical' forces.  Now, as has been previously argued here, the perception of matter presupposes the exercise of a repulsive force by the perceiver.  Thus, insofar as his foundations of natural science entail perceptual activity, how they are 'metaphysical' is problematic, at best.

Proprioception, Ghost in the Machine, Natural Science

Kant's apparent inattention to Proprioception might reflect his agreement with the thesis, common to his era, that its object, sometimes characterized as 'the ghost in the machine', is non-empirical, and, hence, is not the object of a cognition that can be classified as 'perceptual'.  Regardless, contemporary neuro-psychology, by ascertaining the presence of a cerebral 'homunculus' image, reinforces the thesis that Proprioception is an actual empirical cognitive faculty.  If so, then Kant's 'foundation' of the Natural Sciences is physical, not metaphysical.  For, as has been previously discussed, in his system, mechanical forces are derived from dynamical ones, the cognition of which presupposes the awareness, in the observer, of repulsive forces, i. e. presupposes Proprioception.

Proprioception and Dynamics

For Kant, an object of 'outer' perception occupies "another region of space from that in which I find myself" (1st Critique, B 38).  So, since the objects of 'inner' perception occupy moments in time, his theory of Perception does not accommodate the object that occupies the region of space in which one finds oneself--one's lived body--the awareness of which can be termed 'Proprioception'.  Hence, he cannot consider that the object of Proprioception constitutes a Volume, and not a mere Capacity, as do the objects of outer perception.  Furthermore, the body's Motility, e. g. pushing one's foot against the ground as the initiation of taking of step, provides immediate evidence in proprioception of a repulsive force inhering in this Volume, just as inhalation provides immediate evidence of an inhering attractive force.  In contrast, the presence of these Dynamic forces in outer objects is only inferred., e. g. a repulsive force is inferred from resistance to pressure, an attractive force from the spatial delimitations of some matter. On the other hand, proprioception  grounds such outer perception.  So, Proprioception is an awareness of "observed movements . . . in the spectator" (B xxii, note a), and the ground of Dynamics, as well as of the rest of the system of Physics that is derived from Dynamics.

Perception and Repulsion

According to Kant, proof of the presence of a repulsive force in a space occupied by apparently immobile matter is resistance to penetration by an external force.  However, he does not further consider that such an external force is itself a repulsive one.  Hence, he does not entertain that insofar as any sense datum is experienced as filling a space, any act of perception is constituted by a subjective repulsive force encountering an objective one.  Nor is that thesis considered by most other Epistemological theories, which generally treat sensory processes as passively undergone, even Causal theories of perception.

Radial Motion

The prototypical motion of modern Physics is that of an object under the influence of Gravity.  Since that motion is conceived as rectilinear, modern Physics inverts Aristotelianism, by positing rectilinear motion as fundamental, and circular, i. e. curvilinear, motion as derivative.  However, what Repulsion and Attraction, e. g. expansion and contraction, cause primarily are not linear changes, but variations in volume.  Thus, those effects might be classified neither as rectilinear nor as curvilinear, but as 'radial motion'.  Now, since Gravity is a universal attractive force, the linearity of an object falling towards the Earth is an abstraction from the general radial influence of the latter.  Likewise, insofar as linear mechanical motion is caused by a repulsive force, e. g. impact, it, too, is a species of radial motion.  Thus, the presupposed fundamental motion of modern Physics is radial, not linear, i. e. neither recti-, nor curvi-.

Intensive Magnitude and Depth Perception

Kant's thesis that matter fills its space is grounded in the principle, that governs the "anticipations of perception", i. e. that an "object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree".  Now, though he never explicitly uses the phrase, implicit in his examples is that the type of consciousness governed by this principle is often termed 'depth perception'.  But, if so, then he has not responded to Berkeley's challenge that 'depth' is merely an intellectual construct, without sensory correlate.  In other words, a deduction of the very possibility of depth perception seems to be lacking in his exposition, without which his study of Dynamics, and of any Physics that presupposes it, is ungrounded.  Now, one such deduction begins by recognizing that depth is perceivable only via the penetration of some matter, by a perceiver.  But, such penetration is a repulsive force in the perceiver, externally directed.  So, depth perception, on this deduction, presupposes that the perceiver is, itself, constituted by a dynamic force, i. e. by Repulsion, a presupposition that is not easily ascribable to Kant's system, but without which, his Anticipations of Perception, and his Dynamics, seem problematic.