Will, Knowledge, Encounter

The pragmatist reading, 'If one encounters O, one will perceive P', of the objective proposition 'O is P', demonstrates that the contemplatibility and the instrumentality of an object presuppose its encounterability. However, the relation of contemplatibility to encounterability is not one of objective Knowledge to some more primitive mode of contact, but of a more highly developed mode of objective Knowledge to a more primitive one. For, the fundamental organic function of Knowledge is homeostatic--it serves as the Formal Cause of Will by circumscribing Motility, e. g. the color C delimits the field of vision before it is attributed to an object, or before its utility is determined. In other words, all objective Knowledge, even 'information', is a more or less refined circumscription of a Knower. So, an object of Knowledge is not so much what one is not, as Sartre conceives it, but where one cannot move.