Will, Correspondence, Coherence

Epistemological theories can be both explanatory and normative. For example, according to 'Coherence' theories, cognitive processes consist in the integration of a manifold, so that the criteria of Knowledge are consistency and completeness. In contrast, according to 'Correspondence' theories, cognitive processes consist in a relation between mind and something non-mental, with agreement between the two the criterion of Knowledge. Hence, the two types of theory are not competing normative theories with respect to one and the same cognitive model, but are two distinct explanatory models governed respectively by two distinct normative principles. Now, the Correspondence model presents the correlation, when it obtains, between Mind and Object as a fait accompli, whereas according the Formaterial model, any such correlation requires construction, entailing a combination of the extending of Mind towards Object, and the homogenizing of the them. On the other hand, by conceiving Will as the extending of Mind towards some object, and Comprehension as the subsequent integration of that interaction with other such exercises of Will, the Formaterial model shows how a Coherence theory can have greater explanatory power than Correspondence theories. Furthermore, in the absence of a distinct Correspondence explanation of the Mind-Object relation, the Correspondence normative principle remains only a special case of the Coherence normative principle.