Will and Preception

Previously introduced here was the notion 'Preception'--the process of carrying out instructions. Apparently, this practical process has been neglected by Pragmatism, with the only notable treatment being Wittgenstein's study of rule-following. However, the latter focuses only on the linguistic dimension of the process, plus, it leaves unexamined the relation of 'following'. In contrast, according to the model of Experience being developed here, all intelligent behavior is preceptive, and, furthermore, does not consist in a sequence in which first some instructions are presented, and, then, some physiological motion follows. Rather, it entails a combination of Will and Consciousness--the Material Principle and the Formal Principle, respectively, of Experience--in concurrent coordination. More precisely, in action, Consciousness provides some representation that throughout guides and structures the exercise of Will. The common mistake, which Wittgenstein, too, makes, is to construe the representation as appearing only at the outset of the process, with respect to which, the physiological phase is subsequent. But, in fact, the Formal Cause of the process remains operative throughout the presumed merely physiological phase, as is more evident when some course of action is being first learned.