Will, Doubt, Corporeality

A key inference in the Cartesian method is from 'I doubt' to an incorporeal 'I think'. Now, 'I doubt' means, more precisely, 'My representation of some object may be inaccurate', i. e. 'Further consideration could determine that the actual state-of-affairs is otherwise than how I have represented it to be'. Hence, for example, 'I doubt that it is fire that I have been seeing' means 'It is possible that if I put my hand in what I have been visually taking to be fire, I will feel no burning sensation'. Likewise, for the Cartesian, 'I doubt my corporeality' means 'It is possible that I can discover that all that I have been taking to be my corporeal experience has been simulated'. However, a chronic difficulty for the latter analysis is avoiding being question-begging, e. g. the most famous explanation of how such simulation can be accomplished, the 'brain in the vat' model, does not eliminate corporeality. But, the deeper problem for the method is to explain 'otherwise', which it sidesteps by abstracting 'not' from it. In contrast, here, Will, the process of physiological self-activation, is the principle of Diversification in Experience. Thus, on this model, Doubt is not incorporeal. Hence, the Cartesian inference from 'I doubt' to an incorporeal 'I think' is, at minimum, dubious.