Will and Epoche

Husserl's 'Epoche' is a methodological suspension of ordinary experience, to facilitate an examination of Consciousness. The primary effect of the suspension is a transformation of the world of things to a world of phenomena for Consciousness, a sphere of certainty, according to Husserl, and, therefore, suitable to serve as a foundation for all specialized Knowledge. Now, plainly in principle, the blind spot of his Phenomenology is the Epoche itself--since it precedes the opening up of the phenomenological arena, it cannot be examined within it. In contrast, on the model presented here, Will is the source of any experiential discontinuity, so, it must be an ingredient in Epoche, i. e. the latter combines the detachment of Will from a preceding perception, while retaining those perceptual contents for further examination. Now, the incapacity of Epoche to accommodate Will might explain why Husserl's phenomenological world does not include processes such as looking at, listening to, etc. Regardless, since Will is the principle of experiential uncertainty, insofar as it is implicated in Epoche, Husserl's ambition of establishing a foundation certain Knowledge is undermined from the outset.