Henosis and Wonder

Plotinus presents a qualification of the shared assertion of Plato and Aristotle that Philosophy begins in Wonder--it begins in Wonder about specifically Henosis.  But, it is perhaps not until Nietzsche, under the influence of Schopenhauer, systematically contrasts Henosis and Wonder, distinguishing the Dionysian principle of the former from the Apollinian principle of the latter.  However, he stops short of considering the possibility of an interaction of the two, and hence of the possibility that Henosis is more than a self-contained event.  Rather, as is plainly evident, its larger context is comprised of, first, a transition from a condition of separation to a condition of primal unity, and then a re-separation.  He does briefly more comprehensively consider the rhythm of these transitions, but focuses, instead, like Schopenhauer, on the eventual separation exclusively, the result of which is a fixed dualism of the Dionysian and the Apollinian, and, hence, of the abstraction of Wonder from Henosis, thereby undermining a possible internal critique of the effete Intellectualism of some Philosophy, sometimes formulated as the priority of Theory over Praxis.  That critique could be grounded in the interpretation of Wonder as a secondary Henotic moment, and, accordingly, of Cognition, in general, as essentially Volitional.  Regardless, he preserves the non-Cognitive character of his Henosis, avoiding even an interpretation of it as consisting in an anti-Intellectual Intuition, e. g. Bergson's interpretation.