Friendship and Reflection

In Aristotle's concept of Friendship, one treats a Friend as "another Self".  However, he does not consider the possibility of the converse relation--treating oneself as a Friend, probably because his concept of the Psyche as individualized excludes any alterior components.  In contrast, in some more recent concepts of the Psyche, e. g. Freud's and Mead's, internalization of alterity is inherently part of structure.  So, more significantly than that those ground the possibility of treating oneself as a Friend, they ground the possibility of any internal self-relation, i. e. of Reflection.  Accordingly undermined are Aristotle's two cardinal concepts of Reflection--human Contemplation, which, as presupposing the existence of others, is not self-sufficient, and Thought-Thinking-Itself, which is impossible in a monotheistic deity, i. e. one without any other.