Tuesday, May 31, 2016

Psyche and Reason

As has been previously discussed, Freud restores to the Psyche a sub-Rationality that Aristotle recognizes, but, that under the influence of Christianity, gets purged.  Now, since Aristotle attributes a Soul to all living entities, but only Rationality to humans, Descartes' identification of Mind and Soul entails that humans are the only biological entities that possess a Soul, i. e. he conceives each other animal to be a mechanical automaton.  But, Freud gives no indication of attributing a Psyche to any non-human entities.  So, it is unclear if he is following Descartes in that regard, or is implicitly following Aristotle, and, for example, implicitly attributing a Libido to biological entities.  If the latter, then the significant divergence from Aristotle is that he conceives Reason to repress, rather than to enhance, the non-Rational parts of the Psyche.

Monday, May 30, 2016

Psyche, Soul, Body

'Psyche' means 'Soul', so Freud's concept of the former is part of the long and complicated history of the latter.  Plato and Aristotle agree that the Soul has three parts, which can be conceived as vegetative, locomotive, and rational.  However, they diverge regarding the Soul-Body relation--the former conceives them as separable, the latter as Form-Matter, and, hence, as is inseparable.  Now, Christianity adopts the Platonist version, but without attending to one of its apparent coherences--incorporeality, yet, containing vegetative and locomotive dimensions.  In contrast, Descartes resolves that problem by purging the Soul of those parts, leaving it as equivalent to Mind, a concept that dominates for centuries, including when Mind is conceived as Consciousness.  So, Freud's Id restores those dimensions to the Soul, though without distinguishing them.  However, he offers no clear concept of the Soul-Body relation, leaving his theory open to both Epiphenomenal and Physicalist interpretations.

Sunday, May 29, 2016

Conscience, Superego, Superid

Freud's Superego coordinates the relation between the Ego and a Group by interalizing the force of the latter.  When that force is represented as a set of values, it is conceived as 'Morality', with the Superego as 'conscience'.  Accordingly, one's Ego is the locus of a battleground between one's Id and the Group, usually resulting in the repression and sublimation of the latter, though with some residual discontent.  However, this scheme does not account for the concept of Conscience that is connoted in 'conscientious objector'.  For, what is expressed in the latter is not repressed Id, but a discontent with the current Group, on the basis of the values of a different collective organization, for example, that of a Socialist to the dehumanization that is the norm in a Capitalist society.  In such cases, Conscience is an expression of the Superid, i. e. of a Species-principle, in the face of a degenerating mode of organization.

Saturday, May 28, 2016

Superid and Psyche

The Superid is not one drive among others in the Id, it is the very Psyche itself.  It is the fundamental Species-principle, e. g. Will to Live, Will to Power, Will to Evolve, etc., localized in one of its members.  Accordingly, Freud's main structures are three general intra-Psychic functions.  The Id is localized modes of the principle, e. g. nutrition, reproduction, etc.  The Ego unifies the manifold of the drives in the Id.  The Superego coordinates the Ego with other Egos, i. e. integrates it with society.  Thus, Conscience is fundamentally the Superid, and not necessarily the Superego--it can be the voice of society, as well as, as Heidegger conceives it, that of one's Ego.  Thus, since social formations are contingent, so, too, are the contents of the Superego--not only ideological norms, but taboos such as that of incest, as well.   Likewise uncertain is whether any of Freud's familiar objects of Psychoanalytic interest is more than a contingent condition.

Friday, May 27, 2016

Morality, Will to Power, Superid

The concept of Morality that Freud ascribes to the Superego is primarily what Nietzsche calls a Morality of Mores, i. e.  a set of conventional norms.  But, the extension of the concept to the Morality of Autonomy can be problematic.  For example, while the Deontological dimension of Kant's principle, as he himself shows, is derivable from convention, qua Pure Reason, it is self-generated.  Likewise, Aristotle's Mean is essentially a homeostatic principle.  But, a greater challenge is not from a variety of Rationalism, rather from Nietzsche's Will to Power, one expression of which is a drive to Self-Overcome, which can explain not only Autonomy, but the transcending of oneself towards benefiting others.  Indeed, since the Will to Power is the fundamental instinct in any entity, this source of Morality could be classified as what Marcuse briefly calls, though for other purposes, the Superid.

Thursday, May 26, 2016

Group and Beyond Good and Evil

In Freudian terms, Nietzsche's concept of 'Beyond Good and Evil', Ego is the source of its own Superego, i. e. one gives oneself rules of conduct.  That structure can also apply to the members of collectives such as Kant's Kingdom of Ends, and Socialism.  Now, in Freud's concept of a basic Group, the leader functions as Superego to the Egos that are its members.  But, in one variation of a Group, a Mass, i. e. a mob, the leader functions as Ego, while the Egos of its members are dissolved, and they become pure Ids.  So, absent any Superego, the source of standards of Good and Evil, a Mass has also been characterized as 'Beyond Good and Evil'--because no rules of conduct are observed by anyone involved--thus not in the sense intended by Nietzsche.  This misrepresentation of Nietzsche's phrase has been instrumental in some subsequent horrors, as well as some less deadly abuses.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

Psyche and Group

According to Freud's concept of a 'group', interpersonal bonds are the products of sexual drives that have been repressed and sublimated.  Accordingly, Civilization is possible only if repression prevents anarchy, and, perhaps, Hobbesian universal war.  Now, Marcuse's divergence from that analysis accepts the premise that Group-formation is not inherent in a Psyche, though he allows for the possibility of non-repressive sublimation, i. e. under non-alienated economic conditions.  He, thus, accepts, without further analysis, the premise that the sexual drive is a merely individual process.  However, as has been previously discussed, that premise is inadequate, since sexuality is, in fact, part of the reproductive process of the Species, and, hence, an aspect of a governing Species-principle, e. g. Will to Live, Will to Power, etc.  Furthermore, included in any such principle is an instinct to optimal organization that motivates its members.  Hence, contrary to thesis of both Freud and Marcuse, Group-formation is not extrinsic to the Psyche.

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Oedipus and Oedipus Complex

As has been previously discussed, the Narcissus of myth is not a Freudian Narcissist.  Similarly, Freud's other well-known classical reference, Oedipus, does not have an Oedipus Complex.  For, while the latter connotes an unconscious wish to engage in sex with one's mother and kill one's father, the former, in actuality, but unwittingly, commits those acts.  So, nothing comparable to the Id is involved in Oedipus' motivation.  Furthermore, on Nietzsche's interpretation, his Ego is shattered, not by the Superego, but by a force that is more powerful than any conventional mores, which, de-mythologized, could be interpreted as the Species.  So, the reduction of a social Tragedy to a phase in the development of any male psyche only trivializes the name of Oedipus.

Monday, May 23, 2016

Language and Psyche

Freudian Psychoanalysis is a theory second, and a therapeutic method first.  Its primary medium is Language, i. e. the exchange between therapist and patient, as opposed to, say, Art.  But, the use of Language, as trans-personal and rule-governed, can be attributed to only the Superego, thereby potentially compounding the repression that is presumably being treated.  Implicit in that use is an aspect of the Psyche that neither Freud nor Marcuse seems to address--the capacity to verbally communicate, which, as an instinct, must be part of the Id, but, as entailing the existence of others, must be more than merely internal to an individual member of the species.  Their inattention to that capacity is, thus, a symptom that the model of the Psyche that each accepts is, as Atomistic qua independent of the existence of others, already a product of the isolation that typifies their Secondary Narcissism.

Sunday, May 22, 2016

Music and Psychanalysis

As has been previously discussed, an inadequacy of Marcuse's attempt to ground a Socialist, i. e. Eroticized, society on Freud's concept of the Psyche, is that the innocent condition of the latter, Primary Narcissism, consists in a state of Wonder, with respect to which a concept of Practice, which is intrinsic to Socialism, is extrinsic.  Marcuse tacitly acknowledges that inadequacy by deriving from a source other than Freud an image that could account for Practice--Orpheus, a player of Music.  But, by doing so, he just as tacitly acknowledes that the adequate Psychoanalytic ground of his social goal is elsewhere than in the writings of Freud.  Indeed, the involvement of Music in the model is a reminder that the originator of the Psychoanalytic perspective is Nietzsche, inspired by the innovations of Wagner that liberate from repression a hitherto sub- and un-conscious realm of experience.  Furthermore, Nietzsche likens the occasion of that inspiration to Dionysian festivals, which, as fertility rituals, are governed by Eros.  And, the contemplative counterpart of the Dionysian is the Apollonian.  So, the main ingredients of Marcuse's scheme can be found in Birth of Tragedy--Dionysus as Orpheus, the Dionysian as Id and Eros, Apollo as Narcissus, and the Apollonian as Ego.  But, of perhaps greatest potential relevance to Marcuse's project are Nietzsche's brief descriptions in Birth of Tragedy of a Class-free society.

Saturday, May 21, 2016

Eros and Dialectical Materialism

Marcuse's positing of Eros as the fundamental principle of development in human society implies a critique of Dialectical Materialism, though not one that he carries out.  Now, one feature of such a critique can be derived from a familiar instance of Eros--the collaboration of a male and a female in the reproductive process.  But, before that relation is abstractly and arbitrarily represented as a 'polarity', it is concretely and patently one of complementarity.  Similarly, therefore, the Antithesis of Dialectical Logic is no more than a special case of Complementarity, aggrandized by Hegelianism and Marxism.  However, though Marcuse does briefly recognize that some forms of "Logic" are distortions of Eros, his chapter title 'Dialectic of Civilization' suggests that he is unaware that the critique might apply to Dialectical Materialism, as well.

Friday, May 20, 2016

Psyche, Socialism, Play

Marcuse proposes that Freud's Primary Narcissism is a condition that, as repression- and alienation-free, can function as a Psychological foundation of the members of a Socialist society.  However, this innocent wonder at the world, regardless of its degree of fidelity to the mythical character on which the name is based, is inadequate for the purpose.  For, a cardinal feature of Socialism is its priority of Practice over Theory, which is not entailed in such wonder.  In contrast, Play is both innocent and Practical, and, which, upon the encountering of consequences, can be modified, both healthily or otherwise, e. g. channeled into purposeful labor, or repressed or alienated.  Passages in the German Ideology that describe Socialist life suggest a recovery of purposeless enjoyment, thereby reinforcing the proposal that Play is the condition of the Psyche of its members that can adequately found a Socialist society.

Thursday, May 19, 2016

Socialism, Eros, Narcissism

It is easy to conceive Coitus as a basic model of a Socialist society--a productive collaboration.  Furthermore, it can be interpreted as an instance of Eros, and, insofar as involvement in it is voluntary, it can described as 'civilized'.  In other words, a Socialist 'Eros and Civilization' could connote Coitus.  Accordingly, on that basis, the reduction of 'Eros' to a subjective urge, e. g. by both Freud and Marcuse, can be classified as a privatization of a social act, and, hence, as an expression of what each accepts as 'secondary narcissism'.  Likewise classified, therefore, can be Marcuse's "Eros and Civilization" that is developed from it.

Wednesday, May 18, 2016

Eros, Marxism, Beauty

Eros and Civilization can be understood as Marcuse's attempt to supply Marxism with a Psychological theory--a Dialectics of Egoism, in which Dialectical Materialism and Egoism are interpreted as the Freudian concepts Eros and Narcissism, respectively.  Accordingly, his project inherits one of the flaws of Freud's model--an abstraction from the role of Beauty in the myth of Narcissus, as has been previously discussed.  Now, Beauty is systematically related to Eros, and is a cardinal topic in any Aesthetic theory.  So, that flaw is more consequential for Marcuse than it if for Freud.  For, the purported comprehensiveness of Marxism requires accommodation of the relation between Dialectical Materialism and Beauty, as well as an integration of Aesthetic theory into Social theory.

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

Narcissus, Narcissism, Beauty

Marcuse diverges from the standard interpretation of the Narcissus myth, by positing that Narcissus is unaware that the object of his absorption, i. e. the image in the water, is him.  Consequently, he correlates that relation to a presumably external object in what Freud calls Primary Narcissism, which consists in an Ego-World connection that is ruptured in Secondary Narcissism, and, which, thus, provides Marcuse a ground for an incorporation of Freudianism into Marxism, i. e. in which Socialism can be constructed on the basis of Primary Narcissism.  Now, the flaw in Marcuse's interpretation of the myth is that it renders irrelevant the pre-condition of Narcissus' fate--his pride in his beauty.  However, that flaw is easily rectified, whether or not Marcuse approves.  For, as is implicit in that pre-condition, the object of Narcissus' love is not himself per se, but his beauty.  Accordingly, it is his love of Beauty, not his love of himself, that ultimately transfixes him, from which can be drawn a cautionart lesson about the Contemplation of Beauty, which is highly valued in both ancient and modern doctrines.  Thus, the myth can be invoked by Marxism, for which idle Contemplation might be one more counter-revolutionary opiate.  However, Freud's Primary Narcissism is, according to Marcuse, constituted by the Ego's contemplation of the World, and, thus is a target of the caution of the myth.  So, Marcuse can incorporate into Marxism either the myth or his interpretation of Freud's appropriation of it, but not both.

Monday, May 16, 2016

Narcissism, Appearance, Reality

The original Narcissus takes an appearance to be a reality.  Likewise taking an appearance as reality is Freud's representation of what is actually Species reproductive processes as privately experienced Libido.  So, Freud's concept of 'Narcissism', meaning 'self-absorbed', that is derived from that concept of Libido, is 'Narcissistic' in the original sense, i. e. insofar as it takes an appearance to be a reality, as is anyone who believes that Sex is something that one "has".  Conversely, the original Narcissus is not "Narcissistic" in the Freudian sense, since what he is absorbed in is not in reality himself.

Sunday, May 15, 2016

Narcissus and Narcissism

Though Narcissism and Capitalism are each conceived as modes of Egoism, the connection seems to be rarely entertained.  For example, even Marcuse does not exlicitly recognize that Capitalism can be diagnosed as a Sublimation of Narcissism, and, while Narcissism is widely accepted to be a disorder, few seem willing to abandon the Economic system that promotes it.  Regardless, lost in these modernizations of the imagery is that the original Narcissus is more than self-absorbed--he is immobilized, as well.  So, a transcending of Narcissism that goes beyond the mere Sublimation of it is a becoming active.  But, becoming active does not imply non-self-observation; rather, in it, the proper function of self-observation is revealed--to organize and guide what one is doing.  In the process, the development of Narcissism is also revealed--it is self-observation that has strayed from its healthy function in a dynamic vital process.  On that basis, Narcissism, Sublimated or not, is a psychological disorder, contrary to its analysis by Freud and Marcuse each.

Saturday, May 14, 2016

Sublimation and Exploitation

Like 'sublime', but unlike 'subliminal', 'sublimate' is etymologically peculiar, connoting 'elevation', but containing a prefix that connotes 'under'.  Regardless, the concept of Sublimation, which he borrows from Chemistry, is significant for Nietzsche, because it explains a derivation of noble concepts from ignoble origins, thereby offering an alternative to the thesis that such concepts are necessarily supernatural.  Now, for Freud, Sublimation is a Psychological mechanism, in which drives are directed to socially acceptable outlets, some of which are 'higher' expressions, e. g. Art.  However, according to Marcuse, some of those socially acceptable outlets are falsely presented as 'noble', notably alienated Labor, thereby facilitating the exploitation of workers.  So, though Marcuse does not seem to note it, Freud's classification of some merely conventional outlets as 'sublimation' exceeds the scope of Nietzsche's concept, and unwittingly incorporates that deception.

Friday, May 13, 2016

Eros, Thanatos, Species

According to both Freud and Marcuse, Eros, the Life-principle, seeks gratification, gratification is a state of rest, the seeking of a state of rest is the Nirvana principle, and the Nirvana principle is grounded in Thanatos, the Death-drive.  So, according to both, the unprecedent introduction of Thanatos into the concept of the Psyche is entailed in the implication in it of Eros.  However, the premise that Eros seeks gratification presupposes that it is an attribute of an Individual whose participation in the process ends in gratification, e. g. an orgasm.  In contrast, if Eros is attributed to the Species, there is no such moment of cessation; rather, it seeks continuation, e. g. fertilization, etc.  On that basis, Thanatos is not entailed in Eros; rather, it is exposed as an expression of the finitude of the Individual.  So, the diagnoses of both Civilization and its Discontents and Eros and Civilization, insofar as they assume that entailment, are inadequate.

Thursday, May 12, 2016

Eros, Civilization, Species

Freud and Marcuse agree that Eros and Civilization are in conflict, and that the former is a creative drive in the Id of individuals, while the latter is a condition of the species, but Marcuse regards the antagonism as resolvable by Socialism.  However, neither seems to consider that as the drive to reproduce, Eros is a Species-principle.  Accordingly, the relation between Eros and Civilization is not one between Individual and Species, resolvable or otherwise, but between two Species-principles, e. g. a drive to diversify, and a drive to stabilize.  Thus, on the latter basis, a predominance of a drive to stabilize can breed discontent in the drive to diversify, and equilibrium can be restored via the non-alienated sublimation of Eros possible in Socialism.

Wednesday, May 11, 2016

Ontogeny, Phylogeny, Evolution

Freud conceives the human species as seeking Civilization, which necessarily requires the repression of the instincts of its members.  In contrast, according to Marcuse's Marxist diagnosis of that antagonism, it is only contingent, for it is actually a manifestation of resolvable Class-Conflict.  Still, Marcuse accepts the initial terms of Freud's concept of the Species-Member relation, including a version of the thesis that Ontogeny recapitulates Phylogeny.  However, as has been previously discussed, that concept leaves the Species-Member relation undefined, and, so, Marcuse does not consider the possibility that it is that of Whole-Part, from which it follows that Phylogeny is micro-Evolutionary pattern, in which Ontogeny functions as a Mutation.

Tuesday, May 10, 2016

Ontogeny and Phylogeny

It is generally accepted that Freud subscribes to the proposition that Ontogeny recapitulates Phylogeny.  Now, according to one interpretation of it, the thesis expresses a parallel between the developments of two entities--an individual, and its species, respectively.  However, upon closer examination of the typical example of the thesis, what gets recapitulated is not the development of the species, the developments of ancestors of the individual, i. e. developments of prior individuals, in which case it is not Phylogeny that is getting recapitulated.  But, the formulation cannot apply to the earliest ancestors, i. e. because they have no precedent to recapitulate.  So, if the meaning of the thesis is anything more than that Ontogeny is identical in all members of a species, it is unclear what it is.  Regardless, fundamentally lacking in the thesis is any definition of the relationship between a Species and its members, and if, as has been proposed here, it is a Whole-Part relationship, that between Phylogeny and Ontogeny is a lot more complicated than is connoted by 'recapitulate'.

Monday, May 9, 2016

Psyche and Species

Any Organism has both a principle of Diversification and a principle of Unity.  Thus, likewise, insofar as a Species is an Organism of which its members are its parts, it has a principle of each.  Accordingly, each principle is instantiated in the Psyche of each member of a Species.  Thus, each human is motivated by both a drive to disassociate with others, and a drive to associate with others, i. e. instantiating each of the two principles.  In contrast, traditional concepts of the Psyche have usually been Atomistic, i. e. presupposing the essential disassociation of an individual member, on the basis of which relations with others is a contingent problem, e. g. Aristotle's concept of Friendship cannot be derived from his concept of a Mean, Freud conceives the Libido as essentially in conflict with the Superego.  So, the premise of the equiprimordiality of the two principles transforms Psychology into a study of other than merely private motivation.

Sunday, May 8, 2016

Psyche, Will, Reason

Since Aristotle, Psychology--the study of the Psyche = the Soul = animating principle--has been the study of human behavior.  And, since him, the main constituents of behavior, in one guise or another, have been Will and Reason, i. e. motion and its guidance.  Now, for centuries, the former is conceived as an attribute of an Individual, thereby entailing that the latter is, in some respect, impersonal, and, often, anti-personal.  However, nascent in each of the models of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud, though never fully developed, is a non-Individual concept of Will--Will to Live, Dionysius, and Id = It, respectively.  Such a concept becomes clear in the premise of a Species-Principle, e. g. a Will to Evolve, one implication of which is that the animating principle of an Individual is fundamentally non-Individual, thereby mooting the traditional opposition of Will and Reason.

Saturday, May 7, 2016

Psyche, Health, Reason

It is unclear if Freud's Id-Ego-Superego model of the Psyche is intended to correspond in some respect to Aristotle's Vegetative-Animal-Rational model.  Regardless, the latter includes a component that is significantly absent in the former.  For, Aristotle also offers a definition of Psychic Health--Balance, achieved via the application of a Rational principle, i. e. a Mean, to the Animal pursuit of apparent Goods.  In contrast, while Health in specific cases may be obvious, e. g. a limb no longer paralyzed, Freud offers no general concept of it constituted by some configuration of the three elements.  Nor, because there is no indication in it of a corresponding respect for Reason, there is no obvious translation of Aristotle's criterion into Freud's model.  So, in the absence of any inhering concept of Health, Freudian Psychoanalysis remains susceptible to extrinsic conditioning, e. g. irrational Capitalist norms.

Friday, May 6, 2016

Psyche and Phenomenalism

Freud's representation of reproductive processes as Libido or Eros is that of Organism as Psyche, and is a reduction of Biology to Psychology.  It is, thus, a species of Phenomenalism, like, notably, Hume's concept of the Self as a bundle of perceptions.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the World, according to Phenomenalism is 'in me', which, hence, entails an Atomist concept of society that is conducive to Capitalism.  Thus, not only Freud's concept of the individual human, but Marcuse's variation of it, as well, entails some latent, and perhaps unwonted, ideology.

Thursday, May 5, 2016

Psyche and Health

The drives in Freud's Id are governed by a Vitalist principle--to eat, to drink, to reproduce, etc--of which 'Pleasure' is a superficial manifestation.  Accordingly, the governing principle of the Ego is Health, which seeks the optimum coordination and success of those drives, in which 'Reality' is a factor.  Now, in a Hobbesian scenario, the Superego is antagonistic to that Health, but in a well-ordered society, it is simply a dimension of it, i. e. the part of a healthy Ego that seeks integration into society, regardless of any conflicts.  So, it is unclear if Freud's concept of Psyche is of a healthy one, and, hence, if the use of it as a diagnostic tool is conducive to Health.

Wednesday, May 4, 2016

Pleasure and Principle

According to Freud, the Id is governed by the Pleasure Principle, though he leaves the concept of Pleasure unanalyzed, thereby obscuring several potential problems.  First, he does not distinguish between excitation and satiation.  Second, he does not consider, as Spinoza and Nietzsche argue, that Pleasure is merely the subjective aspect of an objective condition--an increase in strength.  Third, Nietzsche's concept of the Will to Power as seeking a "discharge of strength", which is evocative of male sexual processes, suggests that the sexual drive not be subsumed with those that seek "gratification", which evokes receptivity.  Finally, Schopenhauer suggests that Pleasure is a ruse of Nature that lures humans into doing something that they would otherwise avoid--engage in reproductive acts.  In each of the cases, Pleasure is exposed as equivocal or derivative, and, hence, as inadequate as a principle.

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Art, Libido, Eros

Freud conceives Art to be the product of the sublimation of repressed sexual desire.  Now, the case of a prodigy like Mozart does not easily exemplify such a complicated process.  The more general problem with the formulation is that while it likely applies to Libido, it might not apply to Eros.  For, while both are interpretations of sexual desire, he does occasionally characterize the latter as a creative drive, which suggests a contrast between ejaculation and impregnation.  But, propagation is merely a special case of Creativity, from which other varieties are independent.  Thus, the production of Art can be a direct expression of Eros, not a sublimation of Libido, with the former the more plausible analysis of an otherwise underdeveloped child prodigy.

Monday, May 2, 2016

Sex, Reproduction, Humans

One characteristic that seems to distinguish the human species from others is its obsession with sex.  For most organisms, reproduction is one biological function among several, occurring with regularity, e. g.  mating season, occasionally involving idle genital stimulation, e. g. dogs.  In sharp contrast, according to one predominant theological tradition, the entire human species has been cursed because of some genital exposure, replaced by the Freudian myth according to which a person's entire life is determined by early-age psycho-sexual events.  Now, the insubstantiality of that myth is exposed by comparing its concept of 'sexual repression' with the concrete numerical restriction of reproduction in some societies.  Still, for the most part, the Freudian liberation of Sex from its theological denigration has led to the equally hyperbolic alternative to the vilification of Sex--its glorification, to which even Marcuse succumbs.  The common characterization of the instincts in question as 'animal' is thus quite ironic.

Sunday, May 1, 2016

Eros and Libido

Freud's distinction between Eros and Libido follows in the tradition of that between 'love' and 'lust', and between divinely sanctioned and divinely forbidden.  These are various characterizations given the manifestation of one and the same reproductive mechanism, varying according to gender, of course.  In other words, unless Freud has an empirical basis for the distinction, it likely comes from his Superego, an interiorization of a contingent social norm, and, thus, a medium of repression that has infected his diagnostic tools.