Semi-Rationality and Right

In Definition 1 of Part III of the Ethics, Spinoza explains that 'inadequate' means 'partial', i. e. it connotes a degree of privation of Adequacy, not an absolute negations of it.  Accordingly, Passivity is never absolute, an Inadequate Idea is always partially adequate, and, likewise, a deficiency of Reason is, more precisely, a condition of Semi-Rationality, rather than one of Irrationality.  So, some of the previously discussed apparent inconsistencies in his concept of Right can perhaps be resolved with: 1. Every entity is at least semi-rational; 2. Hence, every entity possesses at least some degree of Power; and, therefore 3. Correspondingly, every entity possesses at least some Right.  Consequently, there can be non-political Natural Right, the extent of which can be increased in a Polity.  However, it also follows that desire is never completely "blind" (Political Treatise, II, 5), so Spinoza would need to jettison it and analogous antitheses, if he were to accept the modification.